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Abstract 
From Nye’s famous soft power, a new international relations concept has recently 
emerged: strategic narratives, the narratives which different states use to promote their 
agendas in the international system. This thesis focuses on one particular aspect of Sino-
Japanese relations: the understanding, characterization and possible implications of the 
strategic narratives projected by both countries via the English language version of online 
newspapers about the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands territorial dispute.  
Three periods and three newspapers were selected. The periods were before, 
during and after the September 2012 crisis period, following the announcement and 
effective purchase by the Japanese Government of three privately owned islands. The 
newspapers were the China Daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun. The 
corpus of 188 articles was subjected to content analysis. In order to contextualize the 
discussion, an historical background on the territorial dispute and on the media 
environment in both countries was provided. 
The analysis brings to light a complex set of narratives, which are derived from the 
plurality of sources and views that characterize each one of the three newspapers. The 
concept of strategic narratives proved to be adequate to analyze the “war with words” 
played out in the articles reporting on the dispute. 
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Introduction 
Ever since Joseph Nye came up with the concept in the early nineties, soft power 
has been the target of much academic discussion (Nye 1990). Perhaps one of the reasons 
for the continuous attention it has received is the notion that it can work not only as a 
complement, but even as an alternative to hard power, reducing the need for military 
interventions (and the damage and casualties of thereof) (Gallarotti 2012, 34). Strategic 
narratives are a more recent concept which has been called the “soft power in the 21st 
century” (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2014, 71). They address “how different 
states try to use narratives strategically to sway target audiences”, and “the formation, 
projection and diffusion, and reception of ideas in the international system” (2014, 71); 
they can be seen as an extension of Nye’s original concept. This thesis will focus on 
strategic narratives, analyzing them as “means and methods of persuasion and influence” 
(2014, 71), a way to deploy soft power instead of hard power, to carry out a war with 
words instead of a war with weapons. For this purpose, the thesis has put one particular 
aspect of Sino-Japanese relations under lens: the strategic narratives projected by 
Chinese and Japanese media about a territorial dispute between the two East Asian 
neighbors. More precisely, this thesis analyzes the strategic narratives projected via the 
English language version of Chinese and Japanese online newspapers and their articles 
covering one issue: the dispute in 2012 over the islands in the East China Sea, which are 
named Diaoyu in China, Senkaku in Japan. 
One reason why strategic narratives were chosen as a central concept in the thesis 
is that its advantages are similar to the ones ascribed to soft power: they can be a 
complement or even an alternative to military action. Another reason is that while there 
is already a vast body of academic work on soft power, strategic narratives, a more recent 
concept, have received less attention; this thesis hopes to fill a gap in knowledge and 
generate interest in a topic that hopefully will receive more attention and research in the 
following years. Finally, because narratives deal with issues of identity and perception 
(both of the self and the other), they can provide insight on the mindset and attitudes of 
the countries that use them. In this case, those countries are China and Japan, who have 
a complex and unique relationship that will be another focus point of the thesis. 
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China and Japan are, respectively, the second and third largest economies in the 
world, and two of the most influential nations in their region; therefore, a thorough and 
accurate understanding of the two is not just of regional but also global importance. Of 
course, to claim that the two have already received much academic attention would be 
an understatement; however, any potential additional insight that such a research as this 
may provide might be of relevance and use.  
China and Japan share over a thousand years of history as neighbors; it is expected 
that such a long history would end up producing a layered and multi-faceted connection. 
If, on the one hand, the two neighbors have shared positive experiences (such as trade or 
cultural influence), there have also been historical events, which have led to antagonism, 
resentment and suspicion. Some examples of that antagonism are the two Sino-Japanese 
wars, and modern territorial disputes. 
The nature of territorial disputes constitutes another important element of this 
thesis. Two factors make territorial disputes especially noteworthy: they tend to be long-
lasting, and more likely to lead to armed conflict when compared to other foreign policy 
issues (Riley 2014). Strategic narratives play a role in territorial disputes because “the 
elites’ ability to achieve consensus mobilization behind particular nationalist territorial 
objectives is highly dependent upon the narratives they select to justify them” (Zellman 
2015, 493). Narratives on disputes such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku one can contribute to the 
entrenchment of the dispute in a material, functional and/or symbolic way (Hassner 
2006). 
As it will be shown, the concept of strategic narratives is particularly well suited to 
analyze how escalating tensions over issues such as territorial disputes are dealt with by 
the press, and how press coverage can contribute to the reaction to and the 
entrenchment of these disputes. Therefore, this research will address the press coverage 
of the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute in 2012, when tensions escalated after the 
Japanese Government announced its plans to purchase the islands. Even though the 
concept of strategic narratives has been used in different contexts (Rhodes and Brown 
2005; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013; de Leeuw 2018; Dumitrescu 2018; 
Murrel 2018), the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has been analyzed from many angles (Fogel 
2009; O’Shea 2012a,b; Dreyer 2016), and even an analysis of the press coverage of the 
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Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has already been carried out by Hollihan (2014a), a gap in 
research remains on the characterization of the strategic narratives that were projected 
by the press about this important territorial dispute, in a year in which tensions were 
particularly high to the point that heated words were complimented with the deployment 
of military vessels in the East China Sea. In cases like these, when the risk of a military 
clash is higher than usual, understanding the non-violent, alternative way of protecting a 
state’s interests becomes more relevant; the images that each state tries to project about 
itself and about the other country to an international audience (i.e., their narratives) 
become more strategic than ever. As Nye put it, “international affairs has become a 
matter of ‘whose story wins’” (in Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014, 71). 
With this in mind, this research hopes to help cover that gap by making its main 
research problem the understanding, characterization and possible implications of the 
strategic narratives deployed by the Chinese and Japanese press to an international 
audience. Therefore, this research is summarized in the following question: what are the 
prominent themes within Chinese and Japanese media’s depictions on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, in 2012, and what are the implications of the existence of these 
themes (whether in terms of issues such as the countries' identities, the international 
system they operate in, their views of each other, or their policies)? 
That main question branches off into secondary questions: how do the narratives 
fit within the conceptual frameworks of strategic narratives and/or soft power? How do 
opposing narratives clash with each other? How do different newspapers cover the same 
issue? 
Since the written media (i.e.: newspapers) is one of the significant platforms 
through which strategic narratives are projected, three newspapers were selected: China 
Daily, Yomiuri Shimbun, and Asahi Shimbun. The collected corpus of information – 188 
articles - was further analyzed through content analysis. The results show that the volume 
of information about the dispute in these newspapers increased significantly during the 
crisis period and that each newspaper – with its own identity, related to the social context 
– has developed narratives which include simultaneously common and distinct traits on 
how its own country and the other one is presented. 
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This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter explains the theoretical 
framework. The second chapter addresses the sociohistorical context the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute takes place in, and is divided into two subsections: 1) the modern 
history of Sino-Japanese relations (with a special focus on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute); 
and 2) the media context of each country, with a specific focus on the nature of each 
newspaper chosen for this research. The third chapter presents the methodology. The 
fourth chapter discusses the empirical findings and recontextualizes them through the 
lens of the strategic narratives framework. The two first chapters, thus, address the 
theoretical framework and the historical background while the two last chapters deal, in 
different ways, with the empirical research. The final chapter will be a conclusion that 
reflects on the thesis in general. 
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1. Theoretical framework: Soft power, strategic narratives, and 
territorial disputes 
Strategic narratives are the central concept to the thematic framework of this 
thesis, and as such they make up a significant part of this chapter. However, given that 
strategic narratives are a concept that has evolved out of the idea of soft power, this 
chapter begins with an introduction to the latter (and public diplomacy, a key tool of soft 
power). Afterwards, the nature of strategic narratives will be explained (including the 
different main components of thereof), as well as the nature of narratives in general. 
Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a section on the nature of territorial disputes, and 
how strategic narratives play a role in them. 
 
1.1. Soft power  
In 1990, one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, Joseph 
Nye (1990) wrote on the changes that occurred in the international relations paradigm, 
and how, unlike in the past, sheer military might was no longer the be-all and end-all of 
what constituted a nation’s power. He introduced the distinction between hard and soft 
power. Defining power as having the ability to do or make others do something in the 
service of one’s objectives, Nye argues that coercive power’s importance (while still 
relevant) has been undermined in favor of the power of attraction, which he named co-
optive power or, more famously, soft power. Nye mentions how ideas and the framework 
of the debate can shape the preferences of others, and that there is “intangible power” 
in resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions (Nye 1990, 166-167). The term soft 
power has become popular ever since Nye first wrote on it, and has influenced many 
different academics (including those who have studied strategic narratives). 
Public diplomacy, described as the way governments attempt to influence public 
opinion in other countries (Riley 2014), is an important instrument of soft power 
(Melissen 2005). Both China and Japan have invested in public diplomacy to support their 
foreign policy (d’Hooghe 2005; Duong 2013). For example, Japan used public diplomacy 
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to distance itself from its militaristic past (Watanabe 2018), while China promoted a 
“peaceful rise” narrative against a “China threat” narrative (Scott 2015). Developments in 
the recent decades resulted in the blurring of the line between the two forms of 
diplomacy: traditional (aiming at states and international actors), and public (aiming at 
public opinion) (Melissen 2005). Traditional diplomacy has been challenged and made 
more complex by factors such as the new media environment (the development and 
spreading of radio, TV, and the internet), the growing importance of non-state actors, and 
the growing influence of transnational movements (Melissen 2005; Riley 2014). A nation’s 
reputation, image, and credibility began to be seen just as or more valuable than 
resources like raw materials or land (Riley 2014). It is in this context that the narratives 
China and Japan promote in their English language media become of interest. During the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, the reaction of the Chinese and Japanese governments was not 
merely the use of threats or the deployment of military vessels; instead, Chinese and 
Japanese narratives were strategically used to defend their respective nation’s 
reputation, to portray a positive image of the country, and to demonstrate that the 
country’s credibility was solid (Hollihan 2014b). 
It could be debated whether the Japanese newspapers’ narratives were a part of 
Japan’s public diplomacy. Unlike the China Daily (controlled by the ruling party of China), 
the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun are private, non-state actors; from a more 
traditional point of view their actions would not have been considered part of a country’s 
public diplomacy. But after the Cold War, the traditional idea of public diplomacy as only 
being carried out by state actors began being discarded; non-state private individuals and 
groups are now paid more attention as relevant players in the public diplomacy game 
(Gilboa 2001). As shown in the empirical findings chapter, both Asahi and Yomiuri 
supported Japan’s claims to the islands over China’s (regardless of whatever ideological 
differences they might have). Moreover, the media environment section of the second 
chapter of this thesis illustrates two important points: one, that despite Japanese media 
being considered relatively free, nevertheless there is still some degree of government 
influence in reporting, thanks to government/media arrangements, connections, and the 
so-called “kisha clubs” (press clubs) that limit and control the information flow; two, by 
the newspapers’ own admission, their English language versions were certainly written 
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with the purpose of reaching out an international audience (Yomiuri even mentions how 
it intends to inform influential foreign groups such as businessmen and diplomats), as well 
as English reading Japanese citizens and expats in Japan (Anon 2016a; Anon 2016b).  
With that in mind, it is fair to say that given the way they promoted Japanese 
strategic narratives to foreign audiences, Asahi and Yomiuri’s English language articles 
became a part of the Japanese public diplomacy just as much as China Daily’s English 
language articles were a part of China’s public diplomacy.  
 
1.2. Strategic narratives: a core concept 
At this point, it would be useful to elaborate on what exactly constitutes a strategic 
narrative. First of all, what is a narrative? The word narrative can be synonymous with the 
word “story” (Oxford English Dictionary, in Franzosi 2011b, 2). Roselle, Miskimmon and 
O’Loughlin (2013, 5) refer to it as “frameworks that allow to connect apparently 
unconnected phenomena around some casual transformation. (…) A narrative therefore 
is distinguished by a particular structure through which sense is achieved. This structure 
is comprised of actors; events, plot, and time; and setting and space”. Franzosi further 
explains the omnipresent nature of narratives in all of their variations: “Poem, letter, 
children's book, or newspaper article, for as long as they tell a story, they constitute 
narrative, regardless of text genre.” (Franzosi 2011b, 3). A narrative goes beyond simple 
chronology, which merely lists events in date order. A narrative redescribes events in a 
way that reveals “hidden patterns and hitherto unexplored meanings” (Rhodes and 
Brown 2005, 1).  
The concept of strategic narratives covers a wide range of issues, being, thus, used 
in different contexts. Its meaning is always connected to the idea of building and 
promoting an effective narrative capable of advancing someone’s goals, whether that 
someone is a person, a group, a company, or even a nation. In an organization and 
management context, narratives are important for creating and maintaining corporate 
culture and legitimating power structures within an organization (Rhodes and Brown 
2005, 11). In a marketing context, strategic narratives can help a company make its 
products successful in its respective market (Murrel 2018). And of course, there is the 
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international relations context, which is the context of this thesis (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin 
and Roselle 2013). In their article on the subject, Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 
(2014) explain the usefulness of strategic narratives in international relations, and the 
connection they have with soft power:  
Strategic narrative is soft power in the 21st century. Strategic narrative sets off 
from a similar starting point that Nye faced in 1990 – understanding fundamental 
change in the international system and asking: What are the best methods to 
influence international affairs? Strategic narrative brings us back to core questions 
in International Relations (IR), back to asking what means and methods of 
persuasion and influence are likely to work under what conditions, and to a focus 
on those conditions of communication and interaction, which have changed so 
fundamentally since Nye’s seminal 1990 article. (2014, 71). 
In the field of International Relations, a narrative is strategic whenever it is deployed 
by political actors to frame identities and a sequence of events (giving meaning to past, 
present and future) in order to achieve one or more political goals (Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013). In other words,  
one needs to look at strategic narratives as a power exercise that helps construct 
and reproduce systematically a collective meaning about the present, past and 
future of world politics, with the purpose of influencing the conduct of internal and 
international actors (Dumitrescu 2018, 35).  
Strategic narratives is a complex concept that encompasses a wide range of aspects, 
which will be addressed in the following subsections.1 
 
Narrative components 
There are four components of strategic narratives. 
 
Actors 
“Actors are those who have agency and are depicted as important to the narrative” 
(Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014, 75). At their core, narratives are defined by 
                                                        
1 Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin will be followed closely since they are the authors who developed 
this concept in the field of international relations (2013, 2014). 
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action, which is carried out by actors; the relationship between actors in a narrative is tied 
by action (Franzosi 2011a, 7).  
While the field of International Relations has traditionally focused mainly on state 
actors, the rise of the importance of non-state actors (such as Non-Governmental 
Organizations or transnational corporations) has changed this to a degree, even if the 
focus still remains on states. In the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute narratives, the 
two main actors are obviously China and Japan (as well as other involved states like the 
USA, or the international community in general), but individual, non-state actors like 
citizens protesting in favor of their state’s sovereign rights are also given the spotlight. 
 
Setting/environment/space 
This component refers to the “stage”, to the place where the action is taking place. 
In an international relations context, it concerns the depiction of the international system 
and its workings (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014). In the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute narratives, the international system is the current Westphalian one, where state 
sovereignty is a right by law (Molina 2016, 416-419), and countries that do not respect it 
(i.e.: either China or Japan, depending on the narrative) should be shunned or even 
sanctioned by the other countries. It is also a system where the US dominance is apparent, 
whether it is seen as a help in defending territorial integrity (by Japan), or an unwanted 
and destabilizing outside interference (by China).  
 
Conflict or action 
To acknowledge “Who does what to who or what, and what reactions and 
interactions follow from that?” (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014, 75) is vital. 
Action may take the form of conflict, but action temporality is also important. As 
mentioned above, the time sequence in which events unfold matters. The past, present 
and future are a part of any narrative’s structure. The narratives concerning 
Diaoyu/Senkaku speak of the historical background of the dispute and each countries’ 
respective historical claims to the islands; of the impact the dispute is having in the 
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present (whether in the form of deteriorating relations, protests, and boycotts); and of 
warnings, consequences and predictions of the future.  
 
Resolution or suggested resolution.  
Narratives (particularly strategic ones) present actions capable of resolving the 
current problem, conflict and/or disruption to the status quo. In the case of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku narratives, suggestions and advice on how to deescalate tensions 
between China and Japan are frequently presented; each side is advised to stand back, 
embrace wisdom and moderation, not to jeopardize the important Sino-Japanese 
relations, and to concede to the other side. 
 
Narratives Types/Levels 
Related to the narrative components, there are three narrative types/levels 
(Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014): a) the system narratives describe the 
dominant global order, how it works, and who the relevant actors are; b) the identity 
narratives designate the identities of the actors involved in international affairs, their 
history, goals and values; and c) the issue narratives explain why certain policies are 
necessary, as well as the needed logistics to carry out those policies, and how it will be 
successfully implemented or accomplished. The way this is present in the Diaoyu/Senaku 
narratives will be addressed in the empirical findings chapter; however, because the line 
that separates the different types of narratives is not set in stone (ex: both system and 
identity narratives involve the description of actors), the three sections will have 
overlapping elements. 
 
1.3. Territorial disputes and entrenchment 
Finally, now that both soft power and strategic narratives have been approached, 
one final concept should be expanded upon: territorial disputes. Other than their 
aforementioned tendency to last for a long time and higher chances of causing military 
clashes, there are other relevant factors which should be pointed out. 
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One is the entrenchment factor, the process through which these disputes become 
more unlikely to be resolved as time goes by. Hassner’s analysis of the entrenchment 
process claims that there are three processes at work that lead to intractability of these 
disputes: 1) the material entrenchment (which consists of making it more difficult to 
divide or separate the territory); 2) the functional entrenchment (about making the 
boundaries and borders more precise); and 3) the symbolic entrenchment (makes it 
harder to settle the dispute with monetary compensation or other substitutes, because it 
is connected to ideology) (Hassner 2007, 114-118). This entrenchment is often followed 
by an increasing unwillingness to compromise, and escalation on hostile rhetoric and even 
military clashes (Riley 2014, 236).  
Another factor in territorial disputes is their socially constructed nature (Riley 2014, 
237). Because of this, media narratives can reproduce and enlarge the identities, values 
and discourses that construct these conflicts in the first place; strategic narratives can add 
fuel to the entrenchment of the disputes.  
Paul O’Shea, on his analysis of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute (2012a,b), makes this 
clear through the use of the constructivist sovereignty game concept, one which does not 
necessarily require the use of force, because it “refocuses primary attention away from 
the escalation/de-escalation of conflict, and onto the use of sovereignty as a political 
resource by the states involved.” (O’Shea 2012a, 2), so that  
The logic of the sovereignty game is based upon the premise that the primary 
goal of a state is to gain or maintain sovereignty over the disputed territory. This is 
achieved through the direct exercise of sovereignty over the disputed territory and 
international recognition of this sovereignty, and by preventing the other state 
from doing the same. Just as under contemporary international law states must 
undertake legal protest to another state’s exercise of sovereignty to protect their 
legal claim, thus preventing legal acquiescence, so too in the sovereignty game 
must a state make an effective political protest against another state’s exercise of 
sovereignty to protect their own political claim – thus preventing political 
acquiescence and a change in the sovereignty status quo. (O’Shea 2012b, 3). 
This sovereignty game is very much on display in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. While 
“direct exercise of sovereignty over the disputed territory” is a part of the game that relies 
on hard power, “international recognition of this sovereignty” can be aided through the 
persuasive powers of a well-made strategic narrative projected to an international 
audience, through English language media such as China Daily, Asahi and Yomiuri. 
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Lastly, there is issue-linkage: sometimes a state allows one dispute to escalate and 
remain unresolved so that it may receive concessions on another dispute. China, for 
example, has used this tactic on Japan in the past (Riley 2014, 238). 
 
Synthesis 
The purpose of this chapter was to explain the different theoretical concepts that 
informed the empirical analysis of the newspaper articles. The opening soft power section 
included a subsection on public diplomacy, because the strategic narratives of a country 
are usually inserted in a larger context of its foreign policy, and, by extension, its public 
diplomacy; therefore, that concept had to be made clear. Next, came strategic narratives, 
the core theoretical concept of the thesis. While a concept wide enough that Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) wrote an entire book on the subject, only a summary of 
the elements deemed relevant for this thesis were presented: narrative components 
(actors, setting, action, resolution) and narrative types (system, identity, and issue 
narratives). Finally, because the focus of the thesis is on one territorial dispute, it was 
important to address theory related to territorial disputes, and the ways narratives affect 
disputes (by contributing to their entrenchment, their social construction, and the way 
the sovereignty game is played). With this theoretical framework out of the way, it is now 
time to provide social and historical context to the dispute. 
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2. Sociohistorical background: Sino-Japanese relations, the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, and the media environment 
This chapter is split into two sections providing social and historical context for the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku strategic narratives. The first section deals with the historical background 
of modern Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, and it is also split 
into two parts: part one is a broader summary of modern Sino-Japanese history, part two 
concerns more recent Diaoyu/Senkaku history. The second section explains the unique 
media context of each of the two countries and provides information on the nature of the 
selected newspapers.  
 
2.1. Modern Sino-Japanese history and the origins of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute 
All states in international relations hold a narrative about their own past, 
present and future, and that of the system. No state’s narrative exists in a vacuum: 
the ether of international affairs is filled with multiple narratives – competing and 
overlapping, epochal and issue specific (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 
102).  
The narratives of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute projected in 2012 did not in fact come 
from a vacuum, but were built upon previous historical narratives, and operated with a 
certain historical awareness and understanding in mind. Because of that, a full 
understanding of the strategic narratives analyzed in the empirical findings chapter 
cannot be had without at least some previous knowledge on Sino-Japanese history. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide that historical context, as well as the Japanese and 
Chinese understanding of it. The scope of the history presented here goes from the 
alleged first acquisition of the islands (China claims that they have belonged to China since 
the 15th century, whereas Japan claims that they were terra nullius before being annexed 
by Japan in 1895), to the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War, to the lead-up to the 
Second Sino-Japanese war in the context of World War II, to the postwar/Cold War era, 
to finally the more recent years (with particular emphasis on the 2010-2012 period, which 
contributed to the escalation of the territorial dispute).  
 
  
19 
 
A turbulent century 
Sino-Japanese relations go back at least to the 5th century (Fogel 2009; Jacques 
2013; Dreyer 2016), but the forceful arrival of European and American powers during the 
19th century had a dramatic, irreversible effect in the East Asian nations. China and Japan 
had distinct reactions to the threat presented by the West. While Japan would take steps 
to emulate Western colonial powers with such success that it would eventually install a 
colonial empire of its own, China would fall from grace and repeatedly fail to resist foreign 
intrusion in a series of traumatic events later called “the century of humiliation” (1839–
1949). This sequence of indignities inflicted upon China still informs the way it interacts 
with the rest of the world until this very day, particularly when China views its sovereignty 
being threatened. 
The Chinese view the First Opium War (1839-42) between China and the British 
Empire as the beginning of the century of humiliation, and the end of the Chinese civil 
war (with the Communist Party of China’s victory) as its end. China’s defeat in the Second 
Opium War (1856-1860) only made the matters worse for itself. In the process of these 
wars, China had to make several concessions to foreign powers, including losing Hong 
Kong and paying heavy indemnities (Encyclopædia Britannica 2018). China realized it had 
been drawn to a new international system in which Western powers had the upper hand, 
and while its rulers attempted some “self-strengthening” reforms, ultimately this was not 
enough to prevent the decay and fall of the Chinese imperial system (Qu 2016). For this 
reason, it stands in contrast with the Meiji restoration in Japan. 
Japan did not have its Opium Wars, but it did have a similar “awakening” of sorts: 
the arrival of the Black Ships led by the American Commodore Perry in 1853. Perry’s 
imposing ships, implicit threats, and demands (the opening up of Japan to foreign trade) 
ended three centuries of Japanese isolation, led to a revolution that centralized the 
national power with the emperor in the capital, and began the Meiji Restoration (1868 – 
1912), which modernized Japan in all areas: the political, economic, technological, and 
social (Fujimoto 2003). Japan’s development into a modern nation state allowed it to 
triumph over its former “mentor” when they once again met in the battlefield in the First 
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Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) (Goto-Jones 2009, 42-51), a war over the control of 
Korea. The outcome was the total victory of Japan; in the aftermath, Japan was granted 
control of Korea, Taiwan, and, ultimately, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (2009, 63-66). 
China claims that the islands have long been part of its territory, citing evidence 
such as a Ming dynasty book published in 1403, which shows that China had already 
discovered and named Diaoyu by the 14th century (CD107). Japan disagrees with this 
position, claiming that until the 19th century (when it acquired Okinawa) the islands were 
terra nullius, going so far as saying there is no dispute at all. Regardless of which country 
is in the right, it is an accepted fact that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (signed after the First 
Sino-Japanese War) reinforced the Japanese hold on the islands at the time (Naarajärvi 
2017, 165).  
After losing the first Sino-Japanese war, China’s humiliation continued in various 
forms, such as its defeat in the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), where China was defeated 
by a coalition of foreign powers, which included Japan, and the long period of chaos 
following the revolution of 1911-1912 (which overthrew the Chinese monarchy and 
founded the Republic of China) (Mitter 2016, 28-29). 
With a weakened and divided Chinese Republic and a rising Japan, the stage was set 
for the Second Sino-Japanese War (a part of World War II), which started in 1937 and 
ended in 1945. Japanese aggression and war crimes throughout this war remain in the 
memory of the countries affected; cruel events of the war (such as the infamous Japanese 
“Rape of Nanjing”), and Japan’s perceived failure to properly apologize for its role in them, 
are something that still undermines Japanese relations not only with China but also other 
former victims of Japanese occupation, such as Korea. The outcome of the war is well-
known: the Japanese imperial plans came to an end with its defeat and occupation by the 
American forces, whereas China regained most of its territory and resumed its civil war 
(Goto-Jones 2009, 76-86). In 1949, a triumphant Communist Party of China proclaimed 
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, as the Guomingdang nationalists 
retreated to Taiwan. This was seen as the end of the Century of Humiliation. 
The temporary US occupation of Japan in the postwar period was followed by a 
close alliance between the two, in which (partially due to WWII related restrictions against 
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having a strong military of its own) Japan had to rely on US troops for security (Goto-Jones 
2009, 89-100). While the US does not officially take sides on whose claim to the islands is 
correct, they have pledged to support Japan in case of any armed attack on the territory 
(Manyin 2016). 
From the Chinese viewpoint, it was during the occupation of Japan that the origin 
of the current state of the dispute came to be, namely due to the 1951 San Francisco 
Peace Treaty. This treaty declared that the islands South of 29 degrees of North latitude 
would be under the control of the US military. This was done without consulting either 
China or Taiwan, who did not accept the US’s control of the islands. As the US’s occupation 
ended in 1972, the islands were returned to Japan, in a move still deemed invalid by China 
and Taiwan. A 1970 report highlighting the potentially enormous natural resources in the 
area of the islands only complicated matters (Naarajärvi 2017, 165). The dispute remained 
shelved for the following decades, but would resurface in the early 21st century, 
particularly in 2012, when the Japanese Government announced the purchase of the 
islands from their private owner. 
 
2010 – 2012: The escalation of tensions 
Hostility over the dispute only started to become considerably serious in 2010, when a 
Chinese trawler collided with a Japanese coast guard patrol in the disputed area and the 
trawler’s captain was detained by Japanese authorities for 17 days (Kolmaš 2017). On the 
Chinese side, the detainment resulted in massive protests. On the Japanese side, Tokyo 
governor Ishihara compared China to “gangsters”, and the overall narrative of the 
Japanese government and media was the denouncement of China’s behavior as unlawful 
and aggressiveness; this denouncement was harsher than it had been in the past. In 
response, China retaliated with criticism, sanctions, and citizen organized protests 
(Kolmaš 2017).  
The next diplomatic row would be worse. In 2012, nationalist Tokyo governor 
Ishihara announced that the Tokyo metropolitan government was going to buy three of 
the islands, in order to protect them. The Japanese government was now stuck between 
a rock and a hard place: blocking the purchase outright would make it look weak in the 
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eyes of domestic audiences; but allowing Ishihara to conduct the purchase (and possibly 
build infra-structure on the islands) would attract China’s fury. In the meantime, both 
Chinese and Japanese nationalists carried out a number of increasingly provocative 
symbolic actions to defend their countries’ sovereignty (Hollihan 2014b). 
Faced with growing pressure and two hard choices, the Japanese government opted 
for a compromise, which was announced on the 10th of September: they themselves 
would purchase the islands, thus managing China’s objections more diplomatically than 
Ishihara might have, and preventing any infra-structure from being built in the islands. 
China was not impressed by the compromise; it only became angrier, and just like in 2010, 
Japan was the target of sanctions, boycotts (reducing the trade between the two 
countries) and protests (some of which were violent and resulted in the destruction of 
Japanese property). The Chinese government dispatched Maritime Surveillance Agency 
(MSA) ships into the waters surrounding the disputed area, bringing them precariously 
closer to US and Japanese operational zones at a time of deteriorating diplomatic 
relations (Hollihan 2014; Hafeez 2015). September 2012 marked “the biggest anti-
Japanese protests since China and Japan normalized diplomatic relations in 1972“ (Anon 
2012a). It is from this dramatic time period (August, September and October 2012) that 
the newspaper articles chosen for this thesis were collected.  
 
2.2. Japan and China: Media environment 
While any narrative will always have some universal and omnipresent elements 
(such as actors, setting, etc.), they nevertheless will be influenced by their respective 
media environment (Strate 2014, 10). Because of that, it is important for the narrative 
analysis to have a sense of the specific environments in which these narratives were 
produced. This section will analyze the media environment on two levels: first, the 
national level of each country’s media in general; secondly, the level of each particular 
newspaper addressed in this thesis, as well as the reasoning for their selection.  
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The media in China 
The media environment in China has undergone through significant changes 
throughout the decades, changes whose nature is not just related to the advances in 
media technology and infra-structure (although those have been relevant as well), but 
also due to the changing political paradigms and attitudes in modern Chinese history. The 
articles analyzed in this thesis were written from August to October of 2012, which was 
only one month before Hu Jintao ceded the country’s leadership to Xi Jinping; while there 
were already shifts underway in the Hu Jintao’s years, these would be accentuated during 
Xi Jinping’s leadership up to the present day (Cook 2016).  
 
Political context 
From the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 until the Deng Xiaoping 
era and its reforms started in 1978, Chinese media operated under strict Marxism-
Leninism influenced principles in which it was seen as the “eyes, ears, tongue, and throat 
of the party”, and it was almost fully subsidized by the state (Brady 2017, 129; Guan, Xia 
and Cheng 2017, 234). Alongside the liberalization of the economy in the late 1970’s came 
the commercialization and decentralization of Chinese media, which was still under the 
control (and censorship) of the party, but was no longer a simple extension of the party’s 
propaganda; Chinese newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations were now part 
of a market competing for an audience. The degree to which Chinese media has had 
autonomy has fluctuated ever since then, reaching a high point of autonomy between the 
1990’s and the early 2000’s, then entering a period of decline after that. As far as 
newspapers are concerned, this (relative) autonomy is mostly concentrated on 
regional/local newspapers, which make up the most of Chinese newspapers (Guan, Xia 
and Cheng 2017; Brady 2017, 131-138). Therefore, a major newspaper like China Daily 
would not be expected to stray from the party line (Li and Wong 2018, 37; Zhang 2008, 
310). 
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China Daily 
China Daily is a national level newspaper which is under the control of the People’s 
Daily, the Communist Party of China’s official newspaper. It is also seen as China’s number 
one English language newspaper, and is written with a foreign language-speaking 
audience in mind. Regarding readership, its website’s claims the following: “Our readers 
are from all over the world. Domestic readers mainly include foreigners and high-end 
nationals, for example, diplomats and governmental policy makers. Overseas subscribers 
are mostly government officials, members of parliaments, staff members of international 
organizations and multinationals, professors, researchers and students in universities and 
institutes.” 
So, taking these two factors into account, it can be said that, while China Daily might 
not be the most representative of Chinese newspapers in general, its potential role as the 
“party’s mouthpiece” for the outside world makes it adequate for a study on the use of 
strategic narratives to aid the enacting of foreign policy (Chen 2012, 309). Just like many 
other news outlets in China, it was affected by the commercialization that started in the 
late 1970’s; no longer able to rely only on state subsidies, it had to adopt a more 
commercial approach, even if it is still subject to state control (2012, 309). 
 
The media in Japan 
Given the different political context, it is no surprise that Japan’s media 
environment is significantly different than China’s. In 2012, according to the Freedom 
House watchdog organization, on a scale from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free), Japanese 
media freedom was ranked at 22 points (free), as opposed to China’s 85 points (not free) 
(Anon 2012b; Anon 2012c). However, there are still some nuances that should be 
addressed in regard to the Japanese media (and political) environment. 
 
Political context 
While Japan is a multi-party democracy, for most of the post-WWII period Japanese 
politics have almost uninterruptedly been dominated by a single party, the right-leaning 
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Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Ever since 1955, there were only two times when the LDP 
was out of power; the second of them was between 2009 and 2012, and it was precisely 
in the last few months of the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) incumbency that the 
articles analyzed on this thesis were written (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010; Kushida and 
Lipscy 2013). In fact, the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations during the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis in 2012 has been cited as a factor in the DPJ’s electoral defeat 
(Kushida and Lipscy 2013). 
The dominance of the LDP in the government is seen as having had an impact on 
the media, particularly on public broadcasting. Japan's national public broadcasting 
organization, the NHK, is generally well-trusted by the Japanese as a source of reliable 
information, but the fact that its budget and the selection of its president is dependent 
on the government has led to some tensions. Broadcast laws state that broadcast 
programs shall be “politically impartial”; this has the result of dissuading the NHK from 
taking political stances, effectively leaving political debates to the sphere of privately 
owned media, such as the “big five” main Japanese newspapers (Gatzen 2001). Before 
addressing those “big five”, there is one last important aspect of the Japanese media 
environment that should be mentioned: the “Kisha Clubs”. 
 
Kisha Clubs 
The 2012 Freedom House report stated that, while Japan was classified as having a 
free press and a positive score, nevertheless “concerns regarding the lack of diversity and 
independence in reporting are rooted in Japan’s kisha kurabu, or press clubs” (Anon 
2012b). These press clubs are attached to different governments, businesses and 
institutions (Seward 2005, 20). This press club system is convenient for journalists in the 
way it allows them easier access to information from official sources. However, it has also 
been criticized: even though freedom of the press is a right according to the Japanese 
constitution, critics of the Kisha club system have accused it of allowing authorities and 
other elites to effectively regulate the flow of information for their own purposes (Nester 
1989; Seward 2005; Kuga 2016). In other words, this system undermines the media’s 
expected role as a “watchdog” (Seward 2005; Kuga 2016). 
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The “big five” 
There are five main newspapers in Japan: the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi Shimbun, 
the Mainichi Shimbun, the Sankei Shimbun, and the Nikkei Shimbun. The first two were 
the ones chosen as the sources of the articles to be analyzed in this thesis; they are, 
respectively, the most read and second most read newspapers in Japan (McCurry 2017). 
Yomiuri is seen as more conservative, in favor of a more hawkish foreign policy, and pro-
LDP. Asahi, on the other hand, is seen as more progressive, dovish, and favored by 
intellectuals (Sakai 2003, 164). 
Currently, the English version of Yomiuri is called Japan News, whereas the English 
version of Asahi is called Asia & Japan Watch. Regarding readership, Yomiuri’s corporate 
profile had the following to say (Anon 2016a):  
The Japan News, published by The Yomiuri Shimbun, boasts the largest 
circulation of any English-language daily in Japan. Its mission is to promote 
accurate, well-balanced, quality information in English, based on The Yomiuri 
Shimbun’s editorial policy. (...) The Japan News is widely subscribed to by many 
Japanese and non-Japanese residents, including readers from the business 
community and diplomatic corps in this country.  
Asahi’s corporate report had the following (Anon 2016b):  
In this time of accelerating globalization, it keenly feels the need to gear up to 
become a world recognized brand that can compete in a global environment. Based 
on this belief, the Asahi currently offers news reporting in English and Chinese. To 
further expand its global readership, the Asahi’s English website Asia and Japan 
Watch (AJW: http://www.asahi.com/ajw/) moved to a free platform in April. (…) 
The Asahi Shimbun is making an aggressive push through social media to promote 
English and Chinese news services as a way to expand and cultivate its global 
readership. 
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3. Methodology  
To fulfil the purpose of characterizing the strategic narratives projected by Chinese 
and Japanese newspapers about the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute in 2012, the total 
of 188 newspaper articles were subjected to content analysis of the qualitative kind. But 
the eventual selection of the method of analysis and data collection, the choice of 
quantity, newspapers and time period of the analyzed articles, these were not at all 
obvious decisions at the initial stage of the research. Every scientific research process 
(Maykut and Morehouse 1995; Bryman 2012) implies the existence of ontological 
assumptions (on the nature of reality), epistemological options (on the nature of 
knowledge) and methodological procedures (depending on the aim of the research). 
Social research usually points to the following “phases”: literature review, concepts and 
theories, definition of the research problem and questions, data collection, data analysis, 
and writing up (Bryman 2012); however, they cannot be considered as quite independent 
of one another. They can partially overlap. Every scientific report is a product that arises 
from a process, one full of uncertainties, doubts and discovery; this chapter addresses the 
way that process was conducted. It explains the choice of and reasoning behind the 
methods of data analysis and data collection, as well as the ethical considerations taken 
in this research. 
 
3.1. Data analysis 
Initially, the exact number of articles and words that would be collected and 
analyzed was not yet known, but that such data would be subjected to some form of 
qualitative analysis was always certain. After searching through the literature for 
qualitative methods that would be suitable for written media analysis, ultimately the 
method of content analysis was chosen. Described as “a technique which aims at 
describing, with optimum objectivity, precision, and generality, what is said on a given 
subject in a given place at a given time”, it has frequently been used for analyzing media 
content (Macnamara 2005, 1-2); therefore, it appeared appropriate for this research on 
media narratives. While for Bryman (2012) content analysis is synonymous of quantitative 
content analysis, authors such as Bardin (1979) and Quivy and Campenhoudt (1992) do 
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not support taking the qualitative out of content analysis. They acknowledge the 
existence of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. According to Bardin (1979, 
115), “The quantitative and qualitative approaches do not have the same field of action. 
The first one obtains descriptive data through a statistical method. (...) The second 
corresponds to a more intuitive procedure, but also more malleable and adaptable to 
unanticipated indexes or the evolution of hypotheses.” She adds: “In quantitative analysis 
what serves as information is the frequency with which certain characteristics of the 
content arise. In the qualitative analysis is the presence or absence of a given content 
characteristic”. (Bardin 1979, 21). Yet, to her and other authors there is no rigid border 
between them. The current research assumes both quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of content analysis, although the emphasis is still mostly on the qualitative.  
The collected information – 188 articles, 10923 lines and 106335 words - appears 
under the form of words, sentences, and, sometimes, images. The quantitative content 
analysis aspects allow counting and displaying the data through visual devices such as 
tables and figures; this is useful, but perhaps not enough for a deeper understanding, 
which could include hidden meanings and their relation to a larger context. Hence, 
qualitative content analysis complements what is missing by including the codification of 
data and the construction of categories (themes and subthemes) from deductive and 
inductive origin. 
After finding the articles online (their list can be found in Appendix 1), a copy in 
Word was made. For the first reading, an Excel grid was built, and excerpts and different 
aspects of the articles were assigned to 14 separate entries (Appendix 2). The same 
excerpt could be placed in different entries. From there, a large grid of the 188 articles 
with 1490 lines and 15 columns was made. The articles and this grid were re-read many 
times. From there, another grid was built with themes and subthemes. The themes were 
mostly created in a deductive fashion (i.e.: based on the theoretical framework), while 
some of the subthemes were created inductively (i.e.: derived from the data itself) (Table 
4, Content Analysis Grid, Appendix 5). Based on all of the former, portions of text were 
written up; they eventually formed the data discussion section, which attempts to bridge 
theory and empiria. 
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3.2. Data collection 
With a data analysis method already in mind, the time came to decide on how to 
best build a corpus of newspapers articles for analysis. Only English language articles were 
considered, for two main reasons. The first was that, given the international relations 
context of the strategic narratives concept, the plan was to analyze narratives projected 
especially for a foreign audience. Secondly, while the researcher is fluent in Chinese, he 
is not fluent enough in Japanese to read Japanese language newspapers; for comparison 
purposes, both news sources had to be in English. The research was also based on articles 
published online. This was for practical reasons, and also because such articles are meant 
to reach a wider public. 
Another method of data collecting was considered: the interviewing of some 
Chinese or Japanese on the topic. This was discarded, but nevertheless, several informal 
conversations were held with some masters’ professors - either at Lund, Xiamen and 
Tokyo - as well as with some Chinese and Japanese masters’ students in order to get 
suggestions about the selected newspapers.  
Six newspapers were originally considered (three Japanese and three Chinese). At 
this stage, an experimental “test run” search was conducted with the newspapers 
considered for selection, in order to gauge the number and size of the articles in 2012. 
The search was done using “China”, “Japan”, “Diaoyu” and “Senkaku” as keywords. It was 
a full text search, meaning it included both the headlines and the whole text of the 
articles. For the Chinese newspapers, both China Daily and the (eventually discarded) 
Global Times allowed for a customized search and finding the articles directly through 
each newspaper’s own website (even though for China Daily, a few of the articles required 
paid subscription to get full access, which was purchased). The process was more difficult 
with the Japanese newspapers, which did not allow to find articles from 2012 directly on 
the website. Therefore, two of Asia Portal’s (http://www.asiaportal.info/) information 
resources were used instead: Asahi Shinbun Kikuzo II Visual’s database (for the Asahi 
articles), and the Yomidas Rekishikan database (for Yomiuri). In just three newspapers, 
over 2000 articles were found. Considering the time frame, after several attempts to 
narrow down the corpus, four newspapers were taken into account and, finally, three 
online newspapers were selected. Their names, along with the features that made them 
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of interest, are as follows: Asahi Shimbun, an important left-wing Japanese paper, the 
second most read in Japan; Yomiuri Shimbun, an important conservative newspaper, the 
most read in Japan; and China Daily, effectively CPC owned, and the most read online 
English language Chinese newspaper. Two potential problems arose then. One was that 
there being only one Chinese newspaper and two Japanese newspapers risked making 
the analysis unbalanced; however, China Daily made up for the lack of another Chinese 
newspaper with its comparatively high number of articles (about 2/3 of the total number 
of articles of the three newspapers). The second problem was that after searching 
through Yomidas Rekishikan’s database, it seemed that the articles available in there were 
only the digitalized versions of Yomiuri’s printed newspapers. To verify if this was true, 
the Yomiuri Shimbun English language website’s database was accessed and searched for 
articles (from 2018, which are still available); those were compared with the ones on the 
Yomidas Rekishikan’s database. It became clear that some of the digitalized print articles 
were also published online, but there were still online-only articles not available on 
Yomidas Rekishikan. After weighting options, the conclusion was that it was better to 
include the Yomiuri’s point of view (even if with less articles) than not to include it at all. 
Furthermore, it is likely that the selection of the digitalized articles included the most 
representative ones, since the selection was done by Yomiuri itself.  
To select the time frame was another challenge. As Bryman (2012, 293) states, 
“Sometimes, the decision about dates is more or less dictated by the occurrence of a 
phenomenon.” After considering several possible periods, 2012 was chosen, the year the 
Japanese Prime-Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, decided to buy three of the five islands and 
consequently tensions escalated. After several test run searches, three periods were 
chosen: a) Period 1: the first two weeks of August, before the announcement of the 
purchase; b) Period 2: the first two weeks of September, the crisis period; and c) Period 
3: the first week of October, after the escalation2. The result was a corpus with a total of 
188 articles, 126 of the China Daily, 21 of the Yomiuri Shimbun, and 41 of the Asahi 
Shimbun. 
                                                        
2 For Period 1, in fact, only the first week had been selected (like Period 3), but after realizing the small 
number of articles, one more week was extended in order to have a more reasonable number of news. 
  
31 
For comparison purposes (Chapter 4), a full text search was made on the total 
number of articles about China (in the two Japanese newspapers) and about Japan (in the 
China Daily), during the three periods (710 articles). So, out 710 articles about China and 
Japan in general, only 188 explicitly mentioned the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. 
 
3.3. Ethical considerations and limitations 
All social research handbooks (such as Bryman 2012) mention the importance of 
ethical procedures, which include obtaining the informant’s consent and signature with a 
guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality, and explaining and answering any doubts 
about the purpose and methodology of the study. In this case, however, there were no 
surveys or interviews, just the analysis of previously published articles. So, other usual 
procedures were applied, such as rigorous citations or quotes from books, scientific 
papers, and the three selected newspapers. Furthermore, the point of this analysis of 
narratives is not to decide which side of the dispute is right, or to make value judgments; 
therefore, a pledge was made to beware personal bias and remain as objective as 
possible. This links to the notion of reflexivity (Bryman, 2012), and also to the research 
limitations, which should be acknowledged. One of them is the selected articles’ corpus. 
With these 188 articles it is not possible to generalize, but it is expected to gain a deeper 
understanding of strategic narratives and of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, an 
understanding that should be complemented with other studies in the field. A longer 
period and a higher volume of analyzed newspapers would possibly have been fruitful, 
although a line has always to be drawn somewhere. It was also not possible, due to time 
constraints, to essay other procedures such as providing a narrower analysis (close to 
discourse analysis) of some particular articles, or making a content analysis of the 
published images, or, even less, analyzing media other than the press (for example, social 
media, TV news or radio broadcasts).3 
 
                                                        
3 Other interesting researches could be, for example, comparing the English language version of the 
newspapers to its native language version, or comparing the printed version with the online version of the 
same newspaper. 
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4. Empirical findings: discussion and analysis 
This chapter includes an overview of the collected data together with its 
interpretation. This interpretation was informed by an awareness of the purpose of the 
study (research problem and questions) and the theoretical framework (outlined in 
Chapter 1). Therefore, it makes use of major concepts such as soft power and strategic 
narratives in the context of the Japanese and Chinese press coverage of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute in 2012, the year tensions escalated after the Japanese 
Government’s announcement of the purchase of three of the five islands. The chosen 
newspapers, as explained, were the China Daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Asahi 
Shimbun. The selected periods were Period 1 (Pre-crisis): August 1 to 14; Period 2 (Crisis): 
September 1 to 14; and Period 3 (Post-crisis): October 1 to 7. 
 
4.1. Press coverage: Diaoyu/Senkaku became strategic 
As previously mentioned, the corpus under analysis is composed of 188 articles, 
with around 400 pages, 10923 lines and 106335 words about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute 
through the China Daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun, distributed by three 
periods. However, these 188 articles are part of the total of 710 articles about Japan (in 
the China Daily) and China (in the Yomiuri and the Asahi) for that period of time (Table 1). 
Newspaper Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total 
  D/S Jn/Ch %* D/S Jn/Ch %* D/S Jn/Ch %* D/S Jn/Ch %* 
China Daily 9 217 4,1 107 276 38,8 10 46 21,7 126 539 23,4 
Yomiuri Shimbun 2 24 8,3 10 20 50,0 9 18 50,0 21 62 33,9 
Asahi Shimbun 2 39 5,1 20 41 48,8 19 29 65,5 41 109 37,6 
Total 13 280 4,6 137 337 40,7 38 93 40,9 188 710 26,5 
Table 1 – Articles about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and about the other country (Japan/China) by 
newspaper and period (frequency and percentage)  
*Percentage of articles about Diaoyu/Senkaku (D/S) relative to the total number of articles 
about the other country (Japan/China) 
Table 1 shows us that 2/3 of the articles about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute belong 
to the China Daily (126 articles). Within the one third left about this dispute (62 articles 
from the Japanese newspapers) the Asahi Shimbun presents the double of articles (41 
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articles; 22%) in comparison to the Yomiuri Shimbun (21 articles; 11%)4. So, one first 
finding is that, in general, the Chinese press seems to have paid a lot of more attention to 
the dispute than the Japanese one. This trend also applies to the first two periods, but not 
to the third one. In fact, the China Daily has about the double of articles than the two 
Japanese newspapers together in Period 1 (9 versus 2+2), and in the second one the 
numbers are overwhelming (107 versus 10+20). However, in the post-crisis period, the 
number of the China Daily articles is only about the same than the Yomiuri Shimbun and 
half of the Asahi Shimbun (10 versus 9 versus 19).  
This seems to suggest that a) the Chinese press was paying a little more attention 
to the dispute before the crisis arose, and this attention was strongly reinforced during 
the crisis period (increasing from 9 to 107 articles); and b) the Japanese press showed a 
late response to the dispute. However, when changing the angle of analysis, another 
perspective can be seen. This is the case when the number and percentage of articles 
about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is compared to the total number of articles about the 
other country (about Japan in the CD, and about China in the YS and the AS), as is 
displayed in Table 1: in average, 26,5% of the 710 articles about Japan/China focus on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku tension, with the China Daily being below the average (23,4%) and the 
Yomiuri (33,9%) and the Asahi (37,6%) above it. So, the highest number of articles about 
Diaoyu/Senkaku (China Daily) should be balanced with the highest percentage (Asahi and 
Yomiuri, respectively). Volume should be balanced with proportion. Also, it is noteworthy 
that, in general, the percentage of articles about D/S is short in Period 1 (5%), increasing 
then dramatically to 41% in Periods 2 and 3, with the CD reaching 39%, the YS 50%, and 
the AS 65%.  
In sum: in August, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute was paid comparatively less 
attention by both countries’ newspapers, but this state of affairs drastically changed 
during Periods 2 and 3. The narratives about Diaoyu/Senkaku became more self-
consciously strategic:  
                                                        
4 As previously explained, the Yomiuri articles only correspond to the digital version of printed articles. 
This means that the original number of (online) articles could be higher, but there was no access to them. 
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China also has started making a concerted effort to win international support for 
its claim to the islands. Japan needs to step up its own efforts to make sure that its 
position on the issue is understood (…) (A17). 
 
4.2. Newspapers content: a brief view 
This section consists of a brief characterization of each newspaper’s traits, some of 
which differ, some which are shared by all. Common traits include the fact that they are 
all targeted to an international audience, written in English and available online. 
A careful reading of the 188 articles provides us with a good knowledge of the 
events and chronology, as well as distinct viewpoints. There are several types of articles: 
some more descriptive, others more analytical; some longer, others shorter; some with 
authorship, others not; some with interviews, others with declarations; some with 
photos, others not; etc. Nevertheless, general differences among the narratives displayed 
by the three newspapers can be traced. 
 
China Daily: quantity, history and assertiveness 
When analyzing China Daily, China’s biggest English language newspaper, the sheer 
quantity of its articles should once more be mentioned, as well as the fact it increased 
during the crisis period, and then went down again. This might be partially due to the fact 
that the China Daily is a state-run newspaper in an authoritarian one-party state, and from 
its very creation (1980) was seen as a tool of public diplomacy (Zhang 2008, 308).  
Most of its articles have no authorship or photos (Table 2, Appendix 3), and are 
issued by the national news agency, Xinhua. Many articles are short, descriptive and 
repetitive. In some cases, only the title is changed between articles (CD20 and CD21; CD66 
and CD67). In others there is only a slight change (CD42 and CD44; CD 121 and CD122) or 
they become the basis of a forthcoming longer article (CD112 and CD115). Naturally, 
there are also longer articles, with authorship and/or photos. 
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Among the different kinds of articles, some features can be highlighted. Many adopt 
a firm, almost aggressive tone towards the measures announced by the Japanese, either 
by warning or admonishing, describing possible and strong Chinese counter-measures:5 
The country [Japan] should be informed of the serious consequences of its 
behavior. (CD32)  
China may dispatch cruise ships to claim sovereignty and put direct pressure on 
Japan. (CD39) 
China will never sacrifice its sovereignty to maintain the peaceful development. 
(CD81) 
China will not tolerate Japan’s arrogance, an arrogance that could be disastrous 
to all of East Asia. (CD93) 
Tensions surrounding the Diaoyu Islands are being stirred up single-handedly by 
Japan in an attempt to rewrite Japan's inglorious history of illegally stealing Chinese 
territory. (CD111) 
 
Overt or covert threats can be traced in some of these strong sentences. Acts of 
punishment, including military action, are presented as a possibility on the table. Soft 
power and hard power are not treated as mutually exclusive, but used in conjunction with 
each other. 
Another kind of articles are those that include historical claims. These have become 
an important part of the Chinese media strategy. Some of them go back centuries ago, 
and are quite exhaustive: 
It is known to all that the Diaoyu Islands and the affiliated islands have been 
China's sacred territory since ancient times, which is supported by historical facts and 
jurisprudential evidence. (CD63) 
Thus it can be seen that China, by the early 1400s at the latest, had discovered 
Diaoyu Islands and placed them under its jurisdiction as affiliated to Taiwan. (CD107) 
 
Also regarding historical claims, several articles remember the “fascist” past of 
Japan and the Chinese humiliation under the Japanese army; some of the articles also 
emphasize that Japan never regretted this past, and that this contrasts with the attitude 
of other countries: 
Former German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt down at the monument to Warsaw 
Ghetto victims to show Germany's sincere apology for its crimes committed during the 
Second World War, and a united Germany officially renounced in 1990 all claims to the 
                                                        
5 The excerpts below act as examples; they are not exhaustive. 
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territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. By comparison, Japan, another invader in the 
WWII, not only refuses to apologize for its war crimes, but also goes to so far as to 
"nationalize" territories that belong to another country. (CD63) 
However, what Japan is presently doing is an outright denial of the outcome of the 
victory of the world anti-Fascist war, which constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war 
international order. (CD82) 
At the same time, while never conferring too much importance to the Japanese 
Government’s argument that the purchase of the islands was a way of preventing 
unwanted acts from private hands, the CD stresses the Japanese “rightist” forces that are 
driving this issue. Several articles mention it. Two titles are enough elucidative: Reining in 
Japanese rightists (CD11) and Japanese govt must stop conniving at rightist provocations 
(CD124).  
Most CD articles are about China’s position or moves related to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands. They do not grant much space to the Japanese position (CD10, CD24, CD42, 
CD58). Rather, CD prefers to evoke other countries’ position or the good relationship 
between China and other countries (even mentioning acts of solidarity done by overseas 
Chinese citizens). So, other states (besides Japan) and particular individuals or groups 
become an important social actor targeted in the CD narratives to make their point. As 
Table 3 (Appendix 4) shows, 26 different countries are mentioned, the most represented 
being the US (mentioned in 37 CD articles), followed by Taiwan (21) and South Korea (14).  
 
Yomiuri Shimbun: focus on internal affairs  
Yomiuri, Japan’s main conservative newspaper, has the majority of its articles 
focusing on domestic issues related to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. Yomiuri’s narratives 
portray the different political forces as its actors; they include the (then) Prime Minister 
Yoshihiko Noda, the Liberal Democratic Party led by Shinzo Abe (the once and future 
Prime-Minister), and Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, the nationalist who threatened 
to buy the islands and build infra-structure on them. Several articles concentrate on the 
domestic political tensions, which are often related to particular aspects at stake in the 
dispute. 
The main opposition Liberal Democratic Party is considering issuing a censure 
motion against Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto (Y1) 
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Noda launched his third reshuffled Cabinet on Monday. The purpose of the 
reshuffle, he said, was "to further deepen cooperation between the government and the 
ruling parties and to strengthen the Cabinet's functions." (Y16) 
This week's Cabinet reshuffle is a prime chance for the government to rectify 
previous economic policy blunders. (Y19) 
 
Some articles, however, put the emphasis not only on the territorial dispute with 
China (Y3, Y5, Y17, Y18, Y20) but also the one with South Korea (Y2) and Russia (Y11). An 
explicit reminder of the importance of soft power can be found in Y18 under the title Govt 
should counter China's propaganda on Senkakus:  
China's propaganda campaign over the Senkaku Islands has run rampant, 
conveying false and improper messages to the world. The Japanese government should 
counter China's campaign by demonstrating the legitimacy of Japan's territorial claim on 
the islands to the international community. (Y18) 
 
Asahi Shimbun: moderation and multiple viewpoints 
Left-leaning Asahi seems to display a more balanced stance, having more different 
types of articles and perspectives. It contains a) the account of actions and reactions by 
both Japan (A3, A6, A10, A11, A12, A13, A18, A21, A26, A29, A31, A34, A41) and China 
(A2, A4, A5, A9, A14, A16, A17, A19, A22, A27, A33, A37, A38, A39); b) opposite opinions 
on the dispute, including divergent historical claims (A8, A16, A17, A20, A22, A25, A40); 
c) examples of moderation and good will acts towards the Chinese (A17, A23, A25, A32, 
A35, A40); d) considerations on the economic consequences of the dispute (A15, A19, 
A27, A30, A33, A38, A39), and e) views about the relationship with the two other 
countries with whom Japan has territorial disputes, i.e., South Korea (A1, A12, A13, A18, 
A20, A21, A24, A31, A36, A40) and Russia (A1, A11, A24). Nevertheless, it consistently 
maintains support for Japan’s territorial claims.  
Some examples: 
Two Chinese patrol boats reached waters off the disputed Senkaku Islands on Sept. 
11, a significant escalation in the standoff just a day after Beijing threatened to retaliate 
over a move by Japan's government to nationalize three of the islands. (A14) 
In 1895, Japan found that no other country had laid claim to the Senkaku Islands 
and incorporated them into its territory. (A17) 
Japanese exporters to China are braced for repercussions that could range from 
mob violence to a consumer boycott, and even outright sanctions, amid an escalated 
standoff over the disputed Senkaku Islands. (A15) 
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4.3. System narratives 
“System narratives are about the nature of the structure of international affairs. 
(…) The agency of actors is inherent to this process” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and 
Roselle 2013, 7). 
In China Daily, international law is usually presented as a reason why China is 
entitled to the control of the islands, while the Japanese control of the islands is presented 
as the product of illegal aggression (CD49), and Japan’s current behavior is linked to its 
past as a dangerous imperialist nation: “the dispute (…) reminds the Chinese people of the 
past aggression brought against it by the Japanese military state” (CD29); through these 
lens, Japanese actions on Diaoyu are portrayed as a challenge to the postwar order and 
to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council (CD29). China’s actions to 
reclaim the control of the islands are depicted as compatible with its “peaceful rise” 
narrative, since China tries solving the issue through the proper, official means, whereas 
Japan is only acting through unilateral action. CD highlights China’s integration and 
relevant place in the global order by mentioning its seat in the UN Security Council (CD29), 
once again emphasizing that it wishes to handle the dispute through the proper channels 
of the dominant international system. CD also accuses the Japanese purchase of the 
islands of being a public diplomacy “farce” (CD84). Another recurrent argument in the CD 
articles is that Japan does not accept going to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
contrasting its acceptance of such mediation in its dispute with South Korea (CD118). 
More: China accuses Japan of not even acknowledging the existence of a dispute: “To 
settle a dispute, one must first acknowledge that the dispute exists.” (CD11) 
In fact, the Japanese press mirrors this position through declarations of its Prime-
Minister: "We are not considering using the ICJ," Noda said at a press conference, 
emphasizing there is no doubt the "Senkaku Islands are an integral part of Japanese 
territory both internationally and historically." (CD118) On the Japanese side, there are 
also allusions to the law and the international system, but even considering the smaller 
number of Japanese articles, those allusions are still disproportionately less than the ones 
in the Chinese newspaper. The Japanese newspapers’ main argument is this:  
It was only since the 1970s that the Chinese government began claiming territorial 
sovereignty over the islands, after the existence of an oil deposit was confirmed beneath 
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the nearby seafloor. Before then, Beijing had never objected to Japan's possession of the 
Senkaku Islands. This fact clearly supports Japan's claims. (Y18) 
The idea that Japan is entitled to the control of the islands is taken mostly for 
granted whenever the dispute is mentioned, which might be a side effect of the Japanese 
government’s position that there is no dispute to begin with. There is usually no phrase 
that is a counterpart to the Chinese repeated variations of “the Diaoyu islands belong to 
China”, except in a few articles where the Japanese right to Senkaku is explicitly 
articulated (Y18, A17, A8) such as “The Japanese government's view is that procedures 
were in line with the appropriate means under international law for acquiring territorial 
rights” (A8). In these articles, the two Japanese newspapers mention Japan’s own 
historical claims to the islands, as well as the need to convince other countries of Japanese 
legitimacy in spite of Chinese efforts:  
China also has started making a concerted effort to win international support for 
its claim to the islands. Japan needs to step up its own efforts to make sure that its 
position on the issue is understood by explaining the grounds on which it bases its claim. 
(A17) 
Showing concerns over Chinese propaganda efforts in Europe and the USA (which 
included buying ads in major Western newspapers), Yomiuri supported the Japanese 
government’s investment in public diplomacy and counterpropaganda (Y18). Asahi 
suggests that the reason why Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese territorial 
waters during that time period was precisely to keep the dispute “in the international 
spotlight” (A37); if this assumption is correct, then it showcases how even military 
maneuvers (a traditional element of hard power) can be incorporated into public 
diplomacy (and, by extension, soft power). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, system narratives also are about which actors are 
relevant to the system. In the Japanese and Chinese newspapers’ narratives, the role of 
the USA as the hegemon (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle, 2013) is implicit (and 
sometimes explicit). The Japanese newspapers depict US military presence as a way of 
keeping China in check (Y21, A20). China claims that the main reason Japan has the control 
of the islands is thanks to “backroom deals” with the US (CD82, CD107), and the reason 
why it is not afraid of military confrontation with China is also US assistance (CD29, CD54, 
CD63). China goes so far as implying that the US’s will overrides international law under 
the current system, claiming: “The Japanese government dares to defy the Potsdam 
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Proclamation by claiming the Diaoyu Islands because it has been counting on American 
military support in the event of a military confrontation with China”, adding that Japan 
“lives at the mercy of American military superiority” (CD29). CD urges Japan to stop relying 
on US hegemony for its foreign policy and instead become closer to its regional neighbors 
(CD29), which Japan has alienated “due to its aggressive history during World War II and 
irresponsibility over its history” (CD105). China itself is also portrayed as a rising power, 
one that can alter the balance of the regional system: 
Japan is worried that China's continued rise and the change in the regional power 
balance will end its illegal possession of the Diaoyu Islands and is thus eager to get an 
upper hand in the dispute. (CD27). 
Finally, one recurring theme throughout the articles is sovereignty, and its 
importance. Both countries vigorously play the sovereignty game (O’Shea, 2012a,b); the 
countries justify their actions in the present and in the future (even the eventual 
deployment of military forces into battle) within the framework of the modern 
Westphalian system where nations are entitled to the respect and protection of its 
rightful territory and borders. This implicit acceptance of the system once again marks the 
evolution of China’s foreign policy rhetoric since the Maoist era; that previously 
revolutionary and hostile rhetoric in the past (which openly planned to disrupt dominant 
powers like the US and the Soviet Union) now presents itself as peaceful and international 
law-abiding (Zhang 2008), and thus deserving support from the other world powers. 
 
4.4. Identity Narratives 
Identity narratives are about the identity of the actors of international affairs 
that are in a constant process of constant negotiation and contestation. 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013, 7).  
The nation-state is the actor par excellence of the Westphalian international order. 
While the globalization process highlighted the growing importance of other actors (ex: 
transnational corporations, NGOs), nevertheless this section still mainly addresses the 
characterization of the two main state actors of these narratives: China and Japan. 
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China 
There are many points regarding the characterization of China’s identity which have 
already been mentioned. One is its status as a nation who underwent a “rapid rise as an 
economic and military power” (A24), and as such will not allow another “century of 
humiliation” (CD69). China’s status as a rising power is acknowledged by both countries’ 
narratives: CD mentions China's “continued rise and the change in the regional power 
balance”, whereas Asahi goes as far as interviewing Wang Jisi, a Chinese professor who 
argued that “since China has already ascended to first-class power status in the world, “it 
deserves more respect”” (A40). Keeping up the peaceful rise narrative and rejecting the 
China threat theory, the Chinese press presents its country as a “responsible rising power” 
(CD53), acting harshly only for the understandable and reasonable cause of safeguarding 
its own sovereignty. CD quotes third parties to support this point, such as Iran, whose 
official says “[Iran] speaks highly of China's independent and peaceful foreign policy and 
the positive role China has played in international and regional issues” (CD46). 
The Japanese newspapers, on the other hand, are far more ambivalent in their 
portrayal of China, and at points outright negative. Not only do Japanese newspapers 
defend Japanese historical claims on the islands and reject China’s arguments, but they 
go so far as implying that China might not wholeheartedly believe its own claims and 
might actually be acting disingenuously for self-serving purposes (A8, Y18). They portray 
China as aggressive, and increasingly so as of recent times: “China (…) has a history of 
aggressively protecting what it considers its territory.” (A6). Asahi claims that China’s 
anger is counterproductive and not entirely justified because it is not appreciating the 
Japanese government’s reasoning for its decision, even though such reasoning has been 
repeatedly explained:  
Many Chinese seem to believe the Japanese government took advantage of 
Ishihara’s action to strengthen its control over the islands. But Japan’s decision was 
aimed at preventing unnecessary diplomatic friction over the islands, which would have 
flared if they had come under Ishihara’s management. After all, he has a history of 
exhibiting provocative behavior with regard to China. The purchase was the only possible 
way for the central government to prevent the metropolitan government from gaining 
control of the islands. Japan has repeatedly explained this to China. (A17). 
Interestingly, both Asahi’s most negative and positive article on China consist of an 
interview with a foreign expert. The most negative interview is with Aaron Friedberg, an 
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American scholar, who shows wariness towards the combination of “China's growing 
wealth and power, and the unchanging character of its political regime, the fact that it's 
still ruled by a one-party, authoritarian dictatorship” (A20) and warns Japan not to 
concede on territorial disputes or otherwise “Beijing will just keep pushing” (A20). On the 
other hand, the most positive interview is with Wang Jisi, the Chinese expert who views 
China as a “first-class power status in the world”, who claims that “the leadership in China 
is very prudent and very sober-minded” and who believes that “China’s interactions with 
its neighbors were neutral and defensive” (A40). It should be said, however, that such a 
positive portrayal of China in Asahi is more the exception than the rule. 
As for non-state actors, Chinese citizens are portrayed as being openly against 
Japanese actions, which led to some of them engaging in activism and boycotting 
Japanese products (CD65). While this was applauded as a sign of patriotism by the Chinese 
press, the Japanese newspapers criticized the Chinese government for allowing the “the 
radicalization of the opinions (…) due to anti-Japanese sentiment” (Y5) and the decision 
to “fan Chinese public sentiment against Japan amid a fresh wave of anti-Japanese 
demonstrations” (A17). As some of the anti-Japanese protests turned violent, Asahi 
categorized the violent offenders as “barbaric” (A11), and Yomiuri criticized China for not 
doing enough to dissuade its citizens from being violent (Y5). 
 
Japan 
The previous sections have already made a substantial characterization of CD’s 
portrayal of Japan, where it is consistently portrayed as dishonest on its words and deeds, 
often resorting to what CD calls “tricks” (CD41), a “farce” (CD30), “crafty plots” (CD54), 
“historical lies” (CD 107) and “provocations” (CD30). To further emphasize this point, 
when CD mentions Japan’s plan to purchase the islands, it usually uses words such as 
“nationalize” or “purchase” with quotation marks in a way to delegitimize such actions 
(CD21, CD 25, CD27). There are also allusions to Japan’s fascist past (and Japan’s failing to 
fully deal with that past, which is connected to its present negative attitude), which are 
either explicitly or implicitly made. The idea that Japan can present a “challenge to the 
post-war international order” (CD74) adds elements of a rogue state (Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013) to the Chinese narrative’s characterization of Japan. 
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It is also worth pointing out that with both Chinese and Japanese newspapers there 
is more differentiation between the individual actors within Japan’s politics as compared 
to China; this is likely a product of the differences between a one-party state and a multi-
party democracy. CD writes that the unreasonable actions of the Japanese government 
are in part a product of Japanese domestic politics and the incumbent party’s electoral 
struggles (CD15, CD20). In fact, a common theme between the three newspapers is a 
generally unfavorable portrayal of then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and the DPJ, his 
party, although for opposite reasons: the Chinese side thinks Noda did not stand up to 
the Japanese nationalist right and instead made things worse by purchasing the islands, 
whereas the Japanese side saw Noda’s government as unstable and not assertive enough 
in handling China. Despite Noda’s claim that the island purchase was meant to prevent 
Ishihara, the nationalist Tokyo governor, from escalating the situation, China rejected that 
argument saying that “there is no essential difference between the Japanese government's 
plan and Ishihara's claim, (…) that's why the Chinese will always oppose such moves" 
(CD45). On the other hand, Yomiuri compared Ishihara’s proposal favorably to Noda’s lack 
of initiative:  
Tokyo Gov. Shintaro Ishihara's proactive steps to jump-start the purchase 
negotiations with the owner apparently prompted the central government, which had 
been dragging its feet on the issue, to make such a move (Y8) 
Even Asahi remarks on the DPJ’s loss of confidence among the Japanese public 
(A34). On the topic of Ishihara, Japanese right-wingers as a whole are singled out by CD 
as one of the main causes for the escalation of tensions and Japan’s erratic policies, as 
seen above.  
 
Other state actors 
Japan and China are the main actors of both narratives, but outside actors are also 
mentioned and involved (Table 3, Appendix 4). The United States is treated as the most 
important third party: Japanese newspapers portray the US as a fundamental ally in 
keeping China in check, whereas CD depicts the US as an unbalancing force that is 
encouraging bad behavior on the part of Japan and contributing to regional instability. CD 
links the US’s role in the Diaoyu dispute to a larger context of an adversarial containment 
strategy of China (CD105).  
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Taiwan is mentioned in 21 articles by China Daily, either as a previous administrator 
of the islands and Chinese territory (CD7, CD49, CD54), or for its current position against 
the purchase of the islands (CD64, CD71, CD72). Other main state actors include South 
Korea, Russia and the Philippines, which have their own territorial disputes with either 
China or Japan, and provide a counterpoint to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.  
 
4.5. Issue Narratives 
“Issue narratives are strategic in the sense of seeking to shape the terrain on 
which policy discussions take place” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013, 7). 
This section is related to the narratives surrounding the characterization of the 
issues, their context, and the policies that may solve those issues. It consists of three 
parts: the historical narratives of issues, suggested policies, and the specific issue of 
economic consequences. 
 
Historical background: a meaningful past 
Part of what can “shape the terrain on which policy discussions take place” is the 
historical context. Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2014, 75) talk about “the 
importance of temporality – as narratives are quite often structured to address past, 
present, and future”. While the three periods of time are all present in the narratives one 
way or another, there are three elements of the past which are mentioned repeatedly in 
China and Japan’s Diaoyu/Senkaku narratives, and their significance impacts those 
narratives in a relevant way. Those three elements of the past are 1) China’s “Century of 
Humiliation” (which is mainly mentioned on the Chinese narratives); 2) the “40th 
anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and China” (which is 
mentioned by the newspapers of both countries); and 3) Japan’s “fascist past” (mostly 
referenced by Chinese press). Those elements are further expanded upon and analyzed 
below: 
1) The nature of the instability and foreign interference in China during the century 
of humiliation left a feeling of wounded pride and resentment in the Chinese collective 
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identity, as well as the notion that such indignities must never be inflicted upon China 
ever again, and that China’s modern strength is a tool for this purpose.  
Japan took control of the islands when China was distracted by domestic and 
foreign troubles in the late 19th century. But China is no longer the weak country it was 
then. (CD93).  
Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to bullying and 
humiliation from others. The Chinese government will not sit idly by watching its 
territorial sovereignty being infringed upon. (CD94).  
The link between what China sees as the unlawful control of Chinese territory by 
the Japanese and the way China was mercilessly pushed around by foreign powers in the 
previous two centuries is made explicit in quotes such as these. However, this link can 
also be understood as implied throughout the whole narrative in the way China 
guarantees the protection of its sovereignty.  
2) The fact that 2012, the year in which the tensions over Diaoyu/Senkaku flared up, 
is also the 40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and 
China becomes an irony of fate that is repeatedly mentioned throughout the two 
narratives: 
It should be remembered that this year marks the 40th anniversary of restoring 
diplomatic relations between Japan and China. The two countries should not allow a 
flare-up in a territorial dispute to spoil the celebration of that occasion. (A11)  
It is sad to see this dispute ahead of the 40th anniversary of the normalization of 
China-Japan relations, which ought to be celebrated and used to create closer ties. 
(CD98) 
CD criticizes Japanese politicians for jeopardizing Sino-Japanese relations on such a 
date (CD 107), whereas Asahi (which in 2012 ran a series of articles on the 40 years of 
normalized relations) asks not to let the current disagreement between China and Japan 
ruin the celebration (A11, A32). 
3) Chinese narratives frequently allude to a shared past with the countries which 
opposed the fascist Axis Powers (such as Japan) in WWII in an attempt to elicit sympathy 
and support. As mentioned before in this chapter, China said that the victors of WWII 
have a “legal and moral obligation to enforce the verdict of the WWII” (CD29), which is to 
say, not to let Japan hold territory such as Diaoyu/Senkaku (which should have been 
returned to China’s control as a result of WWII). During a visit of the Papua New Guinea 
Prime-Minister, the Chinese Vice-Premier reminded him that “both China and Papua New 
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Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in the Second World War” and 
that Japanese behavior in regard to Diaoyu “is an outright denial of the outcomes of 
victory in the war against fascism and constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war 
international order”. (CD74) By alluding to a certain historical background, China thus 
shapes the terrain of the issue to its favor, painting Japan in a bad light and China in a 
positive one, creating a dichotomy from which it benefits. 
Even though the Japanese press occasionally mentions China’s past aggressiveness, 
this is a comparatively weaker message. The negative images about the other country do 
not have the same force in the Chinese and Japanese narratives; the Chinese narrative is 
clearly more assertive. 
 
Suggested measures and solutions 
China Daily makes several mentions on how to deescalate the tensions and solve 
the conflict. Its advice on what Japan ought to do can be summed with the following 
quote:  
We urge the Japanese side to make concrete efforts to correct its mistakes, 
immediately stop activities that undermine China's sovereignty, and come back to the 
understanding and consensus reached between the two sides, and return to the track of 
settling the dispute through negotiations. (CD95).  
The appeal for Japan to admit the existence of the dispute and to sit at the 
negotiation table is a recurring theme on the Chinese narrative. At the same time, China 
makes it clear that one thing it will not make concessions on is its territorial sovereignty:   
Premier Wen Jiabao said Monday the Diaoyu Islands are an inalienable part of 
China's territory and China will "absolutely make no concession" on issues concerning its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. (CD47).  
Through CD’s narrative, we can see the description and support of measures that 
effectively promote the entrenchment (Hassner 2007) of the territorial dispute on the 
three different entrenchment levels: 
From announcing base points and baselines of territorial waters of the Diaoyu 
Islands to the patrolling, China has taken just and legitimate actions to safeguard its 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, which has won widespread applause from the 
Chinese public. (CD63) 
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1) Material entrenchment: “China's civil patrol ships Tuesday reached the waters 
around the islands to start patrolling and showing China's sovereignty over these islands.” 
(CD63); 
2) Functional entrenchment: “announcing base points and baselines of territorial 
waters” (CD63); 
3) Symbolic entrenchment: essentially all of the historical references to the Century 
of Humiliation, Chinese and allied resistance against Japanese fascism, and the 
importance of sovereignty. All of these help to confer an ideational quality to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute that goes beyond a materialistic view on the practical need for 
land and resources. 
As for the Japanese narratives, we find the calls for China to keep a cool head, to be 
understanding, and to reach a compromise, stressing Japan’s purpose to "maintain the 
island chain peacefully and stably." (Y6). We can read declarations such as: “We should 
further strengthen our strategic partnership with China." (Y6); “the government did not 
want to provoke China” (Y8); "We do not want anything that would affect the general 
bilateral relations between Japan and China.” (Y12); “Japan’s decision was aimed at 
preventing unnecessary diplomatic friction (...) Japan has repeatedly explained this to 
China.” (A17); or “we have to overcome these immediate obstacles and focus on other 
priorities that are in our best long-term interests.” (A40) 
The Japanese side also had its levels of entrenchment:  
1) Material entrenchment:  
Meanwhile, the nation needs to strengthen the Japan Coast Guard's policing 
system and its authority to beef up surveillance of the Senkaku Islands. A bill to revise 
the Japan Coast Guard Law, which was approved during the current Diet session, is part 
of such efforts. Previously, when foreigners landed illegally on the Senkakus, police 
officers had to come all the way from neighboring islets. But under the revised law, JCG 
officers will be allowed to arrest such intruders. (Y8)  
Interestingly, an article discusses that even more material entrenchment (i.e.: the 
building of infra-structure on the islands, such as the repairing of a lighthouse) could have 
been enacted, but the Japanese government opted against it because it did not want to 
draw China’s anger any more than it already had (Y12). 
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2) Functional entrenchment: “On Sunday, a team of surveyors dispatched by Tokyo 
surveyed the islands and conducted research from boats in the sea surrounding the 
islands.” (Y6) 
3) Symbolic entrenchment: all of the references to the importance of protecting 
Japan’s sovereignty, and the presentation of Japan’s historical claims to Senkaku. The 
symbolic entrenchment of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute on the minds of Japanese citizens 
is meaningfully captured in an article about the formation of a Japanese political party. 
Not just Senkaku, but also the Takeshima islands (disputed with Korea) are symbolically 
entrenched via that new Japanese political party’s logo, which is a map of Japan that 
purposefully includes both sets of disputed islands in it (A18).  
 
Economic consequences for the "cockpit of the global economy” 
The three newspapers thoroughly deal with this economic issue, either by directly 
drawing attention to it or by depicting acts hurting the Japanese economy (namely 
boycotts to Japanese products).  
Acknowledging that the Asia-Pacific region is the "cockpit of the global economy” 
(CD89), both countries show awareness of the possible damage from a trade war, one 
that would have effects beyond their own countries. There is a relation of 
interdependence which works both as an argument for contention and as an instrument 
to make a point. Some articles promote a deeper look into their economic relations in the 
past decades and in the present (CD5, CD91, CD103, A30) while others report actions such 
as the drop of Japanese car sales in China (CD34, CD126), the cancellation of touristic 
tours by Chinese in Japan (A27), or the destruction of Japanese stores in China (A33). 
Not surprisingly, we find crossed arguments. For example, the Japanese stress that 
“China's economy has itself suffered an increasingly evident slowdown.” (A15) and that 
Japan “has the technology China needs and helps create jobs there.” (A15), while the 
Chinese allude to the economic and demographic stagnation of Japan. It is the case of the 
Chinese scholar Zhu Jianrong (professor in a Japanese university in Tokyo and Japanese 
TV commentator) who “realized that Japan's hardening position against China reflected a 
public loss of confidence due to crippling economic challenges at home” (A32) and who 
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declared that “I now have a sense of mission to encourage Japanese to have more 
confidence in their country's place in the world", adding that "That way, I think people 
generally will not cave in to exclusive nationalism” (A32). As stated in the Introduction, 
these two countries are the biggest economies in East Asia and an important part of the 
globalized world. In the characterization of the economic issue, their narratives show 
awareness for what is at stake. 
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Conclusion 
We asked if any of the great powers could create a narrative about that future 
order that they could all buy into. Could a compelling narrative make World War III 
unnecessary? (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013, xi) 
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle open their book on strategic narratives with 
this question. They admit that the question may be naïve, but still conclude that “political 
leaders have no choice but to try and create a consensus around their narrative” (2013, 
xii). This thesis never aspired to single-handedly answer their monumental opening 
question, but it did intend to analyze narratives which not just political leaders, but also 
newspapers tried using to create consensus around one thorny aspect of Sino-Japanese 
relations: the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. Throughout the thesis, different components and 
types of strategic narratives were highlighted: components such as actors, environment, 
action or resolution, and types such as system, identity, and issue narratives. These 
narrative elements, complemented with other concepts such as soft power and different 
aspects of territorial disputes, all presented in the theoretical chapter, served as the 
framework for the analysis of the Chinese and Japanese narratives. The historical 
background and media environment in which the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute coverage took 
place was also provided, this under the assumption that one cannot fully grasp the 
formation, allusions and subtexts of a narrative without understanding the conditions 
from which they emerged. 
Different narratives could only be understood having in mind the previously 
presented details of China and Japan’s shared turbulent past: China’s century of 
humiliation, the acquisition of the islands at the end of the 19th century by Japan (which, 
depending who you ask, was either entirely lawful or an act of imperialistic aggression), 
the US’s hegemonic role through which it returned the islands to Japan (an act China 
characterized as “backroom deals”) and pledged to defend that territory in case of a 
Chinese attack, and the progressive deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in 2012 due 
to the purchase of three of the islands by the Japanese Government (an act presented by 
the Japanese government as a way of preventing tensions from escalating, but 
nevertheless drew angry political and economic retaliation from China). All of these 
historical details made their appearance in the narratives. 
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The media environment section revealed some ironies in the comparison between 
the narratives of the two countries: China is an authoritarian one-party communist state 
which nevertheless allowed for some (limited) media autonomy and commerciality in 
some cases; Japan is a multi-party democracy which despite a mostly free press 
nevertheless has some degree of government influence over private media outlets, in part 
thanks to the press club system. An individual analysis of each of the three selected 
newspapers was also provided. Indeed, awareness of these factors allowed for a deeper 
understanding of the strategic narratives in display. 
The 188 articles revealed diverse narrative trends, which were often intertwined. A 
main narrative stood out for each country. For China, it was the recurrent and detailed 
historical claims which “prove” that the Chinese possession of the islands goes back as far 
as the 14th century, despite Japanese “tricks”; for Japan, it was its “irrefutable” ownership 
of the islands, and that dishonest, aggressive China only started to reclaim the islands in 
the seventies after it was made aware of important natural resources in the area. 
Other relevant narratives were found on two particular points: a) the countries’ 
(self) identities; b) the unique characteristics of each newspaper. 
a) In China Daily, we find a China who depicts itself as a rising power and a 
military/economic powerhouse, but also as a peace-loving nation who respects the 
international order; at the same time, it looks at Japan as an important economic partner, 
but one with an economic slowdown, a difficulty to distance itself from its militarism, and 
one who took an unacceptable, unlawful political measure against China’s sovereignty. In 
the Japanese newspapers, we find Japan sees itself as an economic power and a peaceful 
nation, with a moderate government which (very legally) purchased the islands with the 
intention of preventing a Japanese nationalist hard-liner from making the situation worse. 
China’s unexpected and unwise backlash was portrayed as being part of China’s 
aggressive, threatening identity.  
b) China Daily, a state-run paper, is characterized by the enormous volume of 
information, with an emphasis in historical claims and an assertiveness in its language. 
The Yomiuri and Asahi are both Japanese private newspapers, the first more hawkishly 
conservative, the second more dovish and left-leaning. As such, it is not surprising that 
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Yomiuri focused more on the internal affairs and depicted China rather negatively, while 
the Asahi tended to make more nuanced descriptions of the troubling political and 
economic internal affairs, and of both the Japanese and Chinese positions and policies 
regarding the dispute; at the same time, it depicted friendly gestures towards China (such 
as displaying Chinese movies in Yokohama), published interviews, and provided the 
opinion of people from different backgrounds (including a Chinese and an American 
scholar). Both Japanese newspapers wrote a higher percentage of articles than China 
Daily about the territorial dispute within the total number of articles about the other 
country. In a way, volume was compensated with proportion. 
In the end, while each country’s narratives had their distinctive context, tone, 
connotations, and emphasis, their similarities were easy to see. Despite their discernible 
differences, each newspaper promoted a self-centered picture of their respective country 
as a peaceful and legally acting nation, which contrasted with the other being defined by 
its militarism, aggressiveness, and illegal actions. Which country’s narrative rings the 
truest? That may depend on the reader and is beyond the scope of the thesis. Currently, 
no actual war has yet broken out over those islands; only time will tell how Sino-Japanese 
relations will further evolve in the future.  
As it can be seen, the empirical findings created some information that may be 
worthy of further analysis, recontextualization, and inquiry; it would be of interest to see 
what such further research might produce (as suggested in the methodological chapter). 
After all, in the recent years, there have been more and more academics who took an 
interest in strategic narratives as a noteworthy aspect of international relations. However, 
in comparison to other terms like Nye’s soft power, it is still an underesearched topic. 
Hopefully, this thesis will eventually be seen as a step in the right direction of expanding 
awareness and knowledge on the subject. Even more hopefully, such research will have 
in mind Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle’s opening question, and shed light on how to 
unlock one of the strategic narrative’s greatest potentials: that of being a non-violent 
alternative to violent hard power. 
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Appendix 1 – List of newspaper articles (title and code) 
 
CHINA DAILY 
Article 1 / CD1 - Defense paper plays up naval issue 
Article 2 / CD2 - Japan's defense paper reflects Cold War mentality 
Article 3 / CD3 - What's wrong with children loving their country and city? 
Article 4 / CD4 - Japan ignores history lesson 
Article 5 / CD5 - Cash-rich Chinese firms urged to take acquisition trail to Japan 
Article 6 / CD6 - Japanese cabinet leader urges ministers to avoid Yasukuni Shrine 
Article 7 / CD7 - The way to foil Japan's plans 
Article 8 / CD8 - Japan harms ties 'for own interests' 
Article 9 / CD9 - Activists to protest plan to buy islands 
Article 10 / CD10 - Japan writes letter to China as calls to ease tensions grow 
Article 11 / CD11 - Reining in Japanese rightists 
Article 12 / CD12 - Islands dispute triggers battling ads in US 
Article 13 / CD13 - Tokyo govt starts illegal survey near Diaoyu Islands 
Article 14 / CD14 - Japan's islands survey 'illegal and invalid' 
Article 15 / CD15 - Tokyo up to another trick 
Article 16 / CD16 - Deceit pivots US foreign policy 
Article 17 / CD17 - China lodges representation over Tokyo island survey 
Article 18 / CD18 ´- PLA diplomacy to ease tensions 
Article 19 / CD19 - US position on Diaoyu Islands very dangerous 
Article 20 / CD20 - China cautions Japan over islands dispute 
Article 21 / CD21 - China cautions Japan over bid to 'nationalize' Diaoyu Islands 
Article 22 / CD22 - PLA hopes to ease tensions in Asia-Pacific 
Article 23 / CD23 - Matching words with deeds 
Article 24 / CD24 - Handle Diaoyu issue with care  
Article 25 / CD25 - Actress skips Japanese film premiere 
Article 26 / CD26 - Clinton flies in amid tension 
Article 27 / CD27 - Japan should end the farce 
Article 28 / CD28 - Japan govt to buy Diaoyu Islands: media 
Article 29 / CD29 - Japan stands to lose if Diaoyu row escalates 
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Article 30 / CD30 - Islands-buying farce breaks commitment 
Article 31 / CD31 - Beijing to take 'necessary measures' to defend territory 
Article 32 / CD32 - Japan fans farce on islets 
Article 33 / CD33 - Japanese actress invited to visit China's Diaoyu Islands 
Article 34 / CD34 - Diplomatic row hurts Japanese car sales in China 
Article 35 / CD35 - Better legacy from Clinton 
Article 36 / CD36 - 'Shared duty' of all Chinese to guard territory 
Article 37 / CD37 - Tokyo signals defense shift to disputed islands 
Article 38 / CD38 - Hu: Diaoyu Islands purchase illegal, invalid 
Article 39 / CD39 - Tokyo 'must realize this is serious' 
Article 40 / CD40 - Getting tougher on Japan 
Article 41 / CD41 - Japan should jettison short-sighted tricks 
Article 42 / CD42 - Japan determines to buy China's Diaoyu Islands 
Article 43 / CD43 - Hu's APEC attendance helps boost integrity, innovation, development, 
prosperity: FM 
Article 44 / CD44 - Japan determines to buy Diaoyu Islands 
Article 45 / CD45 - Experts warn Japan against making a wrong move 
Article 46 / CD46 - Sino-Iran ties won't change amid intl changes 
Article 47 / CD47 - Absolutely no concession' on Diaoyu Islands: Wen 
Article 48 / CD48 - Wen vows no concession 
Article 49 / CD49 - China's statement over Diaoyu Islands 
Article 50 / CD50 - Japan's decision on islands illegal: top legislator 
Article 51 / CD51 - China resolutely safeguards sovereignty: FM 
Article 52 / CD52 - Japan's further provocation 
Article 53 / CD53 - Asia-Pacific integration 
Article 54 / CD54 - Diaoyu will remain China's 
Article 55 / CD55 - Foreign minister summons Japan's envoy 
Article 56 / CD56 - Foreign Ministry statement 
Article 57 / CD57 - Mistrust hindering Sino-Japanese ties 
Article 58 / CD58 - Japan to disburse reserve funds to buy Diaoyu Islands 
Article 59 / CD59 - Full text of Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Article 60 / CD60 - Japanese govt signs purchase contract on Diaoyu Islands 
Article 61 / CD61 - Japan appoints new ambassador to China 
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Article 62 / CD62 - Japan PM orders Self-Defense Forces fully prepared 
Article 63 / CD63 - China's determination to safeguard sovereignty unshakable 
Article 64 / CD64 - Taiwan strongly protests against Japan 
Article 65 / CD65 - Chinese riled by Japan's 'purchase' of islands  
Article 66 / CD66 - China's military vows to defend Diaoyu 
Article 67 / CD67 - China's military ready to defend Diaoyu 
Article 68 / CD68 - China voices protest to Japan over Diaoyu Islands 
Article 69 / CD69 - China's top legislature condemns Japan island purchase 
Article 70 / CD70 - CPPCC condemns Japan's purchases of Diaoyu Islands 
Article 71 / CD71 - Taiwan blasts Japan over Diaoyu Islands 
Article 72 / CD72 - PLA pledges support 
Article 73 / CD73 - New Japan ambassador to China appointed 
Article 74 / CD74 - Vice Premier reiterates Diaoyu Islands in meeting 
Article 75 / CD75 - Chinese people support govt on Diaoyu Islands 
Article 76 / CD76 - Tokyo lacking sincerity, experts say 
Article 77 / CD77 - Islands stolen by Japan 
Article 78 / CD78 - Timeline of islands dispute 
Article 79 / CD79 - Cross-Straits people indignant at Japan 
Article 80 / CD80 - US urges peace in dispute over Diaoyu Islands 
Article 81 / CD81 - Expert view on Diaoyu Islands 
Article 82 / CD82 - US seems unusually ignorant about Diaoyu Islands history 
Article 83 / CD83 - Japan's island 'purchase' challenges post-WWII order 
Article 84 / CD84 - Tokyo must come back 'from the brink' 
Article 85 / CD85 - Youths indignant over 'purchase' of Diaoyu Islands 
Article 86 / CD86 - What Panetta's visit means 
Article 87 / CD87 - What major Japanese media said 
Article 88 / CD88 - Japan official criticizes Diaoyu 'nationalization' 
Article 89 / CD89 - US hopes 'cooler heads' prevail 
Article 90 / CD90 - Official criticizes Diaoyu 'nationalization' 
Article 91 / CD91 - 'Island purchase' to have negative impact on trade 
Article 92 / CD92 - Japan's 'island purchase' to affect trade ties 
Article 93 / CD93 - Misjudgment causes misbehavior 
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Article 94 / CD94 - Japan's move violates common ground for ties 
Article 95 / CD95 - China urges settling Diaoyu dispute through negotiations 
Article 96 / CD96 - No compromise on Diaoyu Islands sovereignty: Ma 
Article 97 / CD97 - Philippine renaming of S China Sea fond dream 
Article 98 / CD98 - 'Purchase' of Diaoyu Islands could cost Japan  
Article 99 / CD99 - Trade war will have no winners 
Article 100 / CD100 - China to conduct routine Diaoyu Islands patrols 
Article 101 / CD101 - Sea renaming is politically short-sighted 
Article 102 / CD102 - Diaoyu Islands baseline announcement significant: diplomat 
Article 103 / CD103 - Islands 'purchase will hurt economic ties' 
Article 104 / CD104 - Overseas Chinese protest 'purchase' of Diaoyu Islands 
Article 105 / CD105 - US defense chief prepares for Asia trip 
Article 106 / CD106 - Chinese federations voice islands indignation 
Article 107 / CD107 - Diaoyu Islands cannot be bought 
Article 108 / CD108 - Japan to take measures in response to China ships 
Article 109 / CD109 - Locke pushes for dialogue 
Article 110 / CD110 - Australia enhances military ties with Japan 
Article 111 / CD111 - Japan is trying to cover up Diaoyu's theft: official 
Article 112 / CD112 - 'Purchase' of Diaoyu Island reflects weakened Japan 
Article 113 / CD113 - Resolution reiterated to safeguard sovereignty 
Article 114 / CD114 - Safety of Japanese citizens in China protected: FM 
Article 115 / CD115 - Diaoyu Islands 'Purchase' reflects weakened Japan: experts 
Article 116 / CD116 - Tricks cannot change China's sovereignty over Islands 
Article 117 / CD117 - China refutes Japanese politician's remarks 
Article 118 / CD118 - Japan not to solve islets row via intl court 
Article 119 / CD119 - Noda reshuffles cabinet again 
Article 120 / CD120 - Man captured for attacking Japanese car owner 
Article 121 / CD121 - Chinese surveillance ships will continue Diaoyu Islands patrols: FM 
Article 122 / CD122 - Chinese surveillance ships to continue Diaoyu Islands patrols 
Article 123 / CD123 - Ambassador: Diaoyu Islands are Chinese 
Article 124 / CD124 - Japanese govt must stop conniving at rightist provocations 
Article 125 / CD125 - Japan's new China envoy revealed 
  
58 
Article 126 / CD126 - Toyota's China sales fall by half 
 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN  
Article 127 / Y1 - LDP mulls censure of Morimoto / Defense minister's comments on 
Takeshima prompt calls for reprimand 
Article 128 / Y2 - Taking island row to court / Govt eyes intl trial to show ownership of 
Takeshima isles 
Article 129 / Y3 - Japan-China exchange events put off, canceled 
Article 130 / Y4 - Noda sends letter to Chinese president 
Article 131 / Y5 - China shouldn't treat suspects in car attack like heroes 
Article 132 / Y6 - Govt 'in last stage of talks to buy Senkakus' 
Article 133 / Y7 - Govt to buy 3 Senkaku isles for 2 billion yen 
Article 134 / Y8 - Govt should work out specifics for stable control of Senkakus 
Article 135 / Y9 - Govt to sign Senkaku contract / Islands' purchase scheduled to be 
finalized as early as Tuesday 
Article 136 / Y10 - Japan must swiftly overcome its internal deadlock on TPP 
Article 137 / Y11 - Japan needs solid strategy for territorial talks with Russia 
Article 138 / Y12 - Govt drew up multiple plans for Senkaku use 
Article 139 / Y13 - Mixed reactions to Ospreys / Protesters block Futenma gate, others 
resigned but demand safety 
Article 140 / Y14 - Noda adds new faces to Cabinet / Reshuffled lineup aimed at 
strengthening DPJ ahead of next election 
Article 141 / Y15 - Continuity of key policies top priority 
Article 142 / Y16 - Can Noda's new Cabinet be entrusted to revive Japan? 
Article 143 / Y17 - Chinese customs seizes Japanese newspapers 
Article 144 / Y18 - Govt should counter China's propaganda on Senkakus 
Article 145 / Y19 - All-out efforts needed to avert economic downturn 
Article 146 / Y20 -Toyota's China sales fall by half / Tensions between Japan and China 
weigh on 
Article 147 / Y21 - 2 U.S. carriers deployed to W. Pacific 
 
ASAHI SHIMBUN 
Article 148 / A1 - Lee’s visit to Takeshima came like bolt out of the blue for Japan 
Article 149 / A2 - Hong Kong group departs for Senkaku Islands on a fishing boat 
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Article 150 / A3 - Governor of Tokyo: Develop Senkakus, and I'll halt purchase 
Article 151 / A4 - Chinese authorities question four over Japan flag incident 
Article 152 / A5 - Japanese flag incident not premeditated, Chinese authorities say 
Article 153 / A6 - INSIGHT: Main battle over Senkaku isles waged between Ishihara, Noda 
Article 154 / A7 - Traces of Japanese activity remain on Senkaku Islands 
Article 155 / A8 - China only began openly claiming Senkakus in 1970s 
Article 156 / A9 - Flag-snatching suspects not indicted, given 5 days detention 
Article 157 / A10 - UPDATE: Noda government to buy Senkaku Islands for 2 billion yen 
Article 158 / A11 - Government’s Senkakus purchase aims to end dispute flare-up 
Article 159 / A12 - Abe's remarks on history lack consideration 
Article 160 / A13 - Japan tries to break ice with neighbors on fringes of APEC 
Article 161 / A14 - Senkakus standoff escalates as Chinese patrol boats approach 
Article 162 / A15 - Exporters braced to lose as China strikes back in Senkakustandoff 
Article 163 / A16 - China ups the ante in its row with Japan over Senkaku Islands 
Article 164 / A17 - China’s hard-line response on Senkaku issue counterproductive 
Article 165 / A18 - New political party shows its colors with logo carrying disputed islands 
Article 166 / A19 - China visit cancellations mark a new cost in Senkaku’s dispute 
Article 167 / A20 - Interview/ Aaron Friedberg: More balancing needed than engagement 
with China 
Article 168 / A21 - LDP candidates showing no real leadership qualities 
Article 169 / A22 - China brings up Japan's past militarism in Senkaku dispute 
Article 170 / A23 - Doraemon pre-birthday exhibition brings smiles in Beijing 
Article 171 / A24 - Japan-Russia talks are useful, but Tokyo must demand firm concessions 
Article 172 / A25 - Hu’s Japanese friend calls on him to remember their peace vow 
Article 173 / A26 - Interest in Japan Coast Guard career suddenly surges 
Article 174 / A27 - Chinese cancel Japan tours as media cast doubt on safety 
Article 175 / A28 - 40 Years/ Rocky Partnership: Chinese idol Chen says Japan, China need 
'idol ambassadors' 
Article 176 / A29 - Vox Populi: Protecting Japan at Okinawa's expense 
Article 177 / A30 - Analysis: China slowdown overshadows Japan economy 
Article 178 / A31 - Genba, Morimoto stay in Cabinet; prolonged spat with China expected 
Article 179 / A32 - 40 Years/ Rocky Partnership: Chinese TV commentators struggle to 
bridge troubled waters 
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Article 180 / A33 - Izumiya store in China laments cost of anti-Japan protests 
Article 181 / A34 - Asahi Poll: 39% prefer Abe as prime minister, 34% choose Noda 
Article 182 / A35 - Chinese movies screened again in Yokohama's Chinatown 
Article 183 / A36 - Japan deleted from list of countries on Chinese video-sharing sites 
Article 184 / A37 - Chinese surveillance ships enter Japanese territorial waters again 
Article 185 / A38 - Panasonic's protest-damaged Qingdao factory soon to resume 
operations 
Article 186 / A39 - Mazda sales in China fall 35% in September 
Article 187 / A40 - INTERVIEW/ Wang Jisi: China deserves more respect as a first-class 
power 
Article 188 / A41 - Cabinet decides on Kitera as new China ambassador 
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Appendix 2 - Excel working grid 
 
Entries 
 
Number of article 
Newspaper 
Title 
Themes 
Subscription 
Period 
Date 
Link 
Type 
Photo 
Photo description 
Author 
Sources 
Comments 
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Appendix 3 – Articles with authorship and photo 
 
Newspaper Author % Photo % Articles 
China Daily 52 41,2 26 20,6 126 
Yomiuri Shimbun 0 0 0 0 21 
Asahi Shimbun 19 46,3 35 85,4 41 
Total 71 37,8 61 32,4 188 
Table 2 – Articles with authorship and photo/image by newspaper 
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Appendix 4 - Countries by newspaper and article 
Country China Daily F Yomiuri F Asahi F Total 
Australia CD24, CD53, CD54, CD110 4 Y10 1 A20, A40 2 7 
Bangladesh  CD18, CD22 2         2 
Brunei  CD43, CD53 2         2 
Canada  CD43 1 Y10 1     2 
Fiji  CD50 1         1 
France  CD5, CD11, CD125 3         3 
Germany  CD11, CD16, CD63, CD98, CD123, 
CD124 
6         6 
Greece  CD104 1         1 
India  CD18, CD22 2 Y10 1 A20, A40 2 5 
Indonesia  CD53 1         1 
Iran  CD16, CD46, CD48, CD50 4     A20, A40 2 6 
Malaysia  CD18, CD22, CD109 3 Y21 1     4 
Mexico   Y10, Y11 2   2 
Myanmar  CD18, CD22, CD50 3         3 
New Zealand      Y10 1     1 
North Korea      Y16 1 A40 1 2 
Papua N. Guinea  CD72, CD74, CD76 3     A22 1 4 
Philippines  CD23, CD86, CD97, CD101, CD109 5     A27 1 6 
Poland  CD113, CD123 2         2 
Russia  CD7, CD16, CD24, CD31, CD38, CD39, 
CD41, CD43, CD53, CD62, CD80, CD89 
12 Y1, Y10, 
Y11, Y16 
4 A1, A11, 
A24 
3 19 
Singapore  CD5, CD18, CD86 3         3 
South Korea  CD5, CD6, CD10, CD16, CD24, CD29, 
CD37, CD39, CD57, CD61, CD73, 
CD110, CD118, CD119 
14 Y1, Y2, Y10, 
Y11, Y15, 
Y16 
6 A1, A12, 
A13, A18, 
A20, A21, 
A24, A31, 
A36, A40 
10 30 
Sri Lanka CD18, CD22, CD50 3         3 
Taiwan CD7, CD9, CD36, CD49, CD54, CD56, 
CD59, CD64, CD71, CD72, CD76, 
CD77, CD79, CD82, CD83, CD84, 
CD88, CD90, CD96, CD107, CD123 
21 Y1, Y12, 
Y21 
3 A7, A8, 
A14, A19, 
A29, A35, 
A40 
7 31 
USA CD2, CD4, CD5, CD7, CD11, CD12, 
CD16, CD18, CD19, CD22, CD23, 
CD24, CD25, CD27, CD29, CD35, 
CD49, CD54, CD56, CD59, CD61, 
CD69, CD72, CD73, CD76, CD77, 
CD80, CD82, CD86, CD89, CD93, 
CD105, CD109, CD110, CD115, CD116, 
CD117, CD125 
37 Y10, Y13, 
Y16, Y18, 
Y21 
5 A1, A8, 
A15, A20, 
A40 
5 47 
Vietnam  CD18, CD22, CD23, CD26, CD43, 
CD53, CD109,  
7     A20, A40 2 9 
Total   140   26   36 202 
Table 3 – Other mentioned countries by newspaper and article  
(F = Frequency) 
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Appendix 5 - Content analysis grid 
Themes Subthemes Description Excerpts/Examples 
 
 
 
Time 
Sequence 
 
 
 
 
 
Past 
 
 
Historical claims It is known to all that the Diaoyu Islands and the affiliated islands have been China's sacred 
territory since ancient times, which is supported by historical facts and jurisprudential 
evidence. (CD63) 
Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to bullying and humiliation 
from others. (CD63) 
It was only since the 1970s that the Chinese government began claiming territorial 
sovereignty over the islands, after the existence of an oil deposit was confirmed beneath 
the nearby seafloor. Before then, Beijing had never objected to Japan's possession of the 
Senkaku Islands. This fact clearly supports Japan's claims. (Y11) 
 
Present 
 
Description of 
current acts 
Mainland actress Li Bingbing did not show up at the Tokyo premiere ceremony for Resident 
Evil: Retribution 3D on Monday. The ceremony was attended by leading actress Milla 
Jovovich. Hong Kong tabloid The Sun quoted Li’s manager Ji Xiang as saying that Li did not 
attend the Tokyo event because she had some work to do in Beijing, but also because she 
was concerned with the Diaoyu Islands issue between China and Japan recently. “We’re 
taking the same position as our government. Bingging will attend the film’s premiere 
ceremonies in other countries, but not in Japan,” he was quoted as saying. (CD25) 
Customs authorities in Beijing confiscated Japanese newspapers delivered from Tokyo on 
Friday after refusing them entry to China, it was learned Wednesday. (Y17) 
This summer, Japanese police arrested Hong Kong-based activists who landed on the 
disputed islands. The incident triggered a fresh wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations 
across China. Another incident that further hurt bilateral relations saw Japanese 
Ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa’s official car forced to stop, and then its Japanese flag 
ripped off. This was an unpardonable act of barbarity. (A11) 
The owner gladly agreed that the hall could become the venue of the film festival [in 
Yokoama]. The event runs until Oct. 10, with a choice of eight films from China, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. They include "Farewell My Concubine" and "Under the Hawthorn Tree." 
This celebra-tion of Chinese culture comes at a time of continuing tension between the 
Japanese and Chinese governments over the Senkaku Islands territorial dispute. (A35) 
Major video-sharing websites in China, which host a huge range of overseas content, are 
turning a cold shoulder to TV shows and movies created in Japan. The websites, including 
Youku, Tudou and PPS, recently removed the "Japan" category from their list of countries, 
making it harder for users to find Japanese content. (A36) 
 
Future 
 
Anticipated or 
desired 
consequences 
The country [Japan] should be informed of the serious consequences of its behavior. (CD32)  
With the rise of China and other emerging economies, the trend of development is 
inexorable. Japan should make a correct assessment of the situation and adopt a right 
attitude toward China's peaceful rise. (CD2) 
If Japanese and Chinese leaders hold a summit meeting on the sideline of Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation summit talks this weekend, they should discuss the future bilateral 
relationship from a broad point of view. (Y8) 
Ishihara’s actions over the disputed territory left no choice for the central government but 
to nationalize the islands. It is now vital to ensure that work begins to repair strained 
diplomatic relations between Japan and China. (A11) 
The Noda administration decided not to build a shelter for fishing boats or a lighthouse on 
the islands to avoid making any change to their current state. These decisions were made 
out of consideration to China. Beijing should reflect on these Japanese efforts to prevent a 
diplomatic row over the islands from spinning out of control. (A17) 
Power 
 
 
 
 
 
Hard  Military actions Demonstrating China's undisputable sovereignty over the islands, two ships of the China 
Marine Surveillance (CMS) reached the waters around the islets Tuesday morning. (CD62) 
On Friday, two Chinese surveillance fleets, comprising six ships, arrived in waters around 
the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islets. (CD114) 
For the second day in a row, Chinese marine surveillance ships entered Japanese territorial 
waters around the Senkaku Islands on Oct. 3, a strategy apparently designed to keep the 
dispute over sovereignty in the international spotlight. (...) The Japan Coast Guard is 
maintaining a strong presence in the area. It dispatched 50 or so patrol boats to nearby 
waters in mid-September. (A37) 
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Soft 
 
 
Meetings with 
ambassadors and 
other officials 
 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi on Monday urgently summoned Japanese 
Ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa for a meeting to lodge solemn representations and 
strong protest against the Japanese government's illegal "buying" of the Diaoyu Islands. 
(CD51) 
Media diplomacy 
 
At a time when Japan and China are embroiled in diplomatic tensions over 
the Senkaku Islands, a Japanese man wants his good friend, Chinese President Hu Jintao, to 
remember a pledge they made together in 1984.  
“Let’s recall that day when we vowed never to fight a war again,” said Kiichiro Onodera, 
who served as mayor of Yuza town, Yamagata Prefecture, for four consecutive terms until 
2009 and is called “peng you” (friend) by Hu. (A25) 
It is essential for the nation to conduct public relations activities tenaciously and with a 
clear strategic vision. It is also important to swiftly respond to China's actions at diplomatic 
events. (Y18) 
TV/cinema 
(people) 
 
Zhu and his fellow [TV] commentators espouse a single message: for more open, self-
reflective thinking from the media and citizens of both countries to prevent further 
instances of extreme nationalism as seen in recent demonstrations that raged in cities 
across China. (A32) 
Mainland actress Li Bingbing did not show up at the Tokyo premiere ceremony for Resident 
Evil: Retribution 3D on Monday. (CD25) 
While Chinese society is condemning and protesting a recent trip by Tokyo officials to 
illegally survey the waters near China's Diaoyu Islands, many Chinese netizens are 
"sincerely" inviting a Japanese actress to set foot on the islands. (CD33) 
"Movies let us appreciate countries and cultures directly, and we can enjoy them 
regardless of politics," Kajiwara said. "Especially at a time like this, I want people to watch 
Chinese films in the Chinatown and develop a better understanding of each other's 
culture." (A35) 
System 
narratives 
 
Main social 
actors 
(China and 
Japan) 
Contextualization 
or structure of 
the international 
order 
As a permanent member of UN Security Council, China should discuss the dispute over the 
Diaoyu Islands at the Security Council in order to peacefully resolve the issue with Japan. 
(CD 29) 
The Japanese government's view is that procedures were in line with the appropriate 
means under international law for acquiring territorial rights (A8) 
Identity 
narratives 
State social 
actors 
 
China 
 
 
 
 
China’s rapid rise as an economic and military power (…). (A24) 
Since China has already ascended to first-class power status in the world,” it deserves more 
respect” (A40) 
As a responsible rising power, China has promised to maintain economic stability and 
strong economic growth by stimulating domestic demand and rebalancing its domestic 
economy to help the global economy recover. (CD53) 
Well, I think China is obviously a rising power in the sense that it's growing rapidly 
economically and increasing its military power. And those factors, in and of themselves 
would not be a great concern. The real source of the concern is the combination 
of China's growing wealth and power, and the unchanging character of its political regime, 
the fact that it's still ruled by a one-party, authoritarian dictatorship. (A20) 
Japan Both China and Papua New Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in 
the Second World War (CD74) 
(…) Japan has never seriously reflected on its militarist past or made a serious apology. 
"Such a remorseless attitude has made it difficult for Japan to earn the trust of its 
neighbors and the forgiveness of people around the world." (CD123) 
By placing the islands under state control, the [Japanese] government is apparently 
carrying out its plan to "maintain the island chain peacefully and stably." (Y7) 
Other countries 
and their official 
representatives  
 
Both China and Papua New Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in 
the Second World War (CD74) 
Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr said Friday morning that Australia will take a neutral 
stance over China-Japan territorial disputes of Diaoyu Islands, while pledging to enhance 
military tie with Japan. (CD110) 
Lee's visit to the Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan has sparked protests from around 
the nation. Some people criticized the government for failing to stop Lee from visiting the 
  
66 
islands. Known as Dokdo in South Korea, the islands are at the center of a territorial 
dispute between the two countries. (Y1) 
Before holding further territorial talks with Russia, Japan must firstly strengthen the base 
of its negotiation stance. (Y11) 
As far as Japan is concerned, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak crossed the line, and 
in doing so threw relations with Japan into a tailspin. (A1) 
Non-state 
social actors 
 
Citizens, groups, 
scholars, TV 
people, VIPs 
Angered by Japan's so-called "purchase" of some of the Diaoyu Islands, a Chinese territory, 
people in China of various walks of life have expressed support for the Chinese government 
in introducing countermeasures. (CD75) 
Chinese expats in Greece staged on Thursday a demonstration in front of the Japanese 
embassy in Athens, protesting the "purchase" of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese 
government. (CD104) 
As Beijing maintains its hard-line stance, a feeling of tension is rising among Japanese 
people living in China. Some have reported being refused rides by taxi drivers. (A19) 
In mid-September, Ye Qianrong, a professor of Chinese studies at Tokai University in Tokyo, 
appeared as a commentator on a Hong Kong news program aired by Phoenix TV, a major 
Chinese broadcasting station. To the Chinese audience, he repeated the same message of 
"anti-nationalism," which he discusses whenever he has the chance in Japan. (A32) 
Recent coverage includes a smoke bomb thrown into the Chinese Consulate-General in 
Fukuoka and a plastic bottle containing black ink hurled at the Consulate-General in Osaka. 
Circulating over the Internet are photos of demonstrators carrying a banner that reads 
“Sink Chinese ships.” (A27) 
Issue 
narratives 
History 
 
Recurrent 
historical themes 
 
Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to bullying and humiliation 
from others. (CD63) 
It should be remembered that this year marks the 40th anniversary of restoring diplomatic 
relations between Japan and China. The two countries should not allow a flare-up in a 
territorial dispute to spoil the celebration of that occasion. (A11) 
It is sad to see this dispute ahead of the 40th anniversary of the normalization of China-
Japan relations, which ought to be celebrated and used to create closer ties. (CD98) 
Economy 
 
Economic 
consequences 
"If Chinese consumers, in a reasonable manner, express their positions and views against 
Japan's violation of China's territorial sovereignty, I think it is within their rights to do so 
and it is understandable," Vice-Minister of Commerce Jiang Zengwei said at a news 
conference on Thursday. (CD103) 
Customs authorities in Beijing confiscated Japanese newspapers delivered from Tokyo on 
Friday after refusing them entry to China, it was learned Wednesday. (Y17) 
Violent anti-Japan protesters who stormed an Izumiya Co. department store in Suzhou, 
Jiangsu province, rang up 100 million yen ($1.3 million) in damage, the company said. 
(A33) 
The national economy has taken another turn for the worse. The government and the Bank 
of Japan must step up their vigilance and make all-out efforts to revive economic growth. 
(Y19) 
Education 
 
Patriotism in 
school content 
Japan has made many mistakes in its handling of relations with China. It has refused to 
face up to history and has approved history textbooks that whitewash its heinous war 
crimes. Such serious mistakes are detrimental not only to bilateral relations but also to 
Japan's credibility and image on the world stage. The Japanese people have become 
anxious over their country's strained ties with China, and have urged the government to 
seriously reflect on its view of history. (CD124) 
Effects of patriotic education 
However, an opinion survey conducted by a Chinese portal site on the Internet showed that 
80 percent of respondents supported the attack on the Japanese ambassador's car. It is 
alarming for Japan that many people praised the attack, calling the suspects "heroes." 
There is a slogan in China that a patriotic act should not be considered a crime. However, it 
is certainly a problem that the destruction of Japanese cars and restaurants by anti-Japan 
demonstrators is virtually permitted in that nation. We must point out that the strong 
effects on young people of the patriotic education by Chinese authorities are behind the 
radicalization of the opinions they express on the Internet due to anti-Japanese sentiment. 
(Y5) 
Table 4 - Content analysis grid  
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